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ABSTRACT
The Detection, Prevention and Mitigation of
Cascading Outages in the Power System. (December 2006)
Hongbiao Song, B.S., North China Electric Power University, China;
M.S., North China Electric Power University, China
Chair of Advisory Committee: Mladen Kezunovic
This dissertation studies the causes and mechanism of power system cascading
outages and develops new methods and new tools to help detect, prevent and mitigate
the outages. Three e®ective solutions: a steady state control scheme, a transient
stability control scheme, and an interactive system-wide and local scheme have been
proposed using those new methods and tools.
A steady state control scheme can help detect and prevent the possible cascading
outage at its initial slow steady state progress stage. It uses new methods and new
tools to solve the line overload, congestion or bus high/low voltage problems. New
methods, such as vulnerability index (VI), margin index (MI), network contribution
factor (NCF), topology processing and selected minimum load shedding (SMLS), and
new tools, such as transmission network control based on a network contribution
factor (NCF) method, generator control based on a generator distribution factor
(GDF) method, and load control based on a load distribution factor (LDF) method
have been proposed and developed.
A transient stability control scheme can help prevent and mitigate the possible
cascading outage at its transient progress stage if there is enough time to take ac-
tion. It uses one Lyapunov direct method, potential energy boundary surface (PEBS)
method, and sensitivity analysis of transient energy margin for fast stabilizing con-
trol. The results are veri¯ed by the accurate time-domain transient stability analysis
iv
method.
The interactive scheme takes advantage of accurate system-wide and local infor-
mation and analysis results, uses some techniques from both steady state control and
transient stability control, works at both the system-wide level and local substation
level, monitors the system all the time, and takes actions when needed to help detect,
prevent and mitigate the possible cascading outage.
Comprehensive simulation studies have been implemented using the IEEE 14-
bus, 24-bus, 39-bus and 118-bus systems and promising results show the ability of
the proposed solutions to help detect, prevent and mitigate cascading outages.
vTo my wife, Jing Zhang, and my parents, Jianting Song and Haimin Gao, for their love and support
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
A. Problem Statement
Electric power system is one of the biggest and most complex man-made sys-
tems. It is composed of thousands of generators, transformers, transmission lines,
substations, loads and extensive infrastructure of measurement, communication and
control equipment. It has been integrated into one big synchronous system (50 or 60
Hz) covering a large geographic area. Fig. 1 shows a basic structure of the electric
system [1]. Fig. 2 shows a basic structure of the North American Interconnections
covering USA, Canada and a part of Mexico [1].
Fig. 1. Basic structure of the electric power system
Electric power system is exposed to all kinds of internal and external threats
since it covers such a large geographic area. Too many factors, such as bad weather,
natural disasters, human errors, tree/animal contacts, equipment malfunction, inten-
tional intrusion, etc., can result in disturbances, i.e., faults and unplanned outages,
This dissertation follows the style of IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control.
2Fig. 2. Basic structure of the North American Interconnections
in the power system. Power system can withstand most disturbances without ser-
vice interruption to customers through proper and timely protective relay and other
control actions. Customers may even not feel the impact of disturbances. A small
number of disturbances may have system impact such as service interruption, voltage
reduction, demand redution (load shedding). For example, there were about 28 to 63
disturbances with system impacts yearly in North America Power System from 1996
to 2002 [2].
We are interested in a more severe kind of system disturbances, cascading out-
ages, which refers to the uncontrolled successive loss of system elements triggered
by a disturbance [1]. Large area blackouts are always the ¯nal results of cascading
outages.
Compared with hundreds of disturbances with local impact and dozens of distur-
3Table I. Summary of some cascading outages around the world
Location Date Load loss
(MW)
A®ected Peo-
ple
Collapse
Time
Restoration
Time
US-Northeasten Nov. 9, 1965 20000 30 million 13 mins 13 hrs
New York July 13, 1977 6000 9 million 1 hr 26 hrs
France Dec. 19, 1978 29000 26 mins 5 hrs
US-Western Dec. 22, 1982 12350 5 million
Sweden Dec. 27, 1983 67% of load 53 secs about 5 hrs
Tokyo July 23, 1987 8200 2.8 million 20 mins about 75 mins
US-Western July 2, 1996 11850 2 million 36 secs a few mins to
several hrs
US-Western Aug. 10, 1996 30500 7.5 million >6 mins a few mins to 9
hrs
Brazil Mar. 11, 1999 25000 75 million 30 secs 30 mins to 4 hrs
US-Northeasten Aug. 14, 2003 61800 50 million >1 hr up to 4 days
Denmark/Sweden Sep. 23, 2003 6550 4.85 million 7 mins average 2 to 4.3
hrs
Italy Sep. 28, 2003 27700 57 million 27 mins 2.5 to 19.5 hrs
Greece Jul. 12, 2004 9000 5 million 27 mins 3 hrs
Moscow May 25, 2005 2500 4 million 2 hrs 20 mins >6 hrs
bances with system impact yearly, cascading outages are relatively infrequent because
power system owners, operators, engineers and researchers do the followings to ensure
the secure and reliable operation: plan the operating studies, prepare for the worst
fault scenarios and emergency conditions, enhance of quick response capability, de-
sign redundancy of generation and transmission capacity, provide backup capabilities,
etc. [1].
However, cascading outages are not as few as people may assume. Lots of cas-
cading outages with catastrophic social and economical impacts in history tell us that
there is still a long way to solutions capable of detecting, preventing and mitigating
cascading outages. Table I is a summary of some major cascading outages around
the world [1, 3{16].
There are two questions of interest in this study related to the cascading outages:
² Why cascading outages occur?
4² How to detect, prevent and mitigate them?
B. Causes and Consequences
There are lots of factors making power system prone to cascading outages, which
can be roughly classi¯ed into two goups: a) non-technical factors, such as change in
operating procedures due to deregulation, aging infrastructure and lack of investment,
and inadequate personnel training for new operating conditions, b) technical factors,
such as operating di±culties, increased system complexity, more di±cult protection
setting coordination, inadequate traditional security analysis, lack of understanding
of the cascades and unavailability of e®ctive support tools.
1. Non-technical Causes
² Change in operating procedures due to deregulation. The original power system
is designed to be operated in a vertically integrated and regulated environment.
The power °ow pattern and load can be predicted with some degree of con¯dence
in such situations. Protection relay settings and transfer limits can be easily
set and coordinated by o®-line studies. With the deregulation and competition,
load and generation are di±cult to forecast and power °ow transfer changes
quickly due to the economic reason. In such instances, it is di±cult to perform
precise planning to provide adequate protection and security control. The power
system has being operated closer to its short circuit and security limits due to
economic reason.
² Aging infrastructure and lack of investment. Many generators, transmission
lines, transformers, protective relays, etc., are 40 years, 50 years old or more.
The failure rate increases for aged equipment. Compared with the steady in-
5creasing load and generation, upgrading of transmission facility is pretty slow
due to an uncertainty of the economic return from transmission investment.
Lack of transmission becomes a "bottleneck" both to economic transfer and se-
curity concern. Combined, aging infrastructure and lack of investment lead to
more vulnerable operation since the system is being stressed more now. Thus
cascading outages are more probable.
² Inadequate personnel training for new operating conditions. The requirements
on power system operators are much higher than before due to deregulation.
Power system operators may lack training to be able to interpret system situa-
tional awareness and hence may not be able to make correct action to preserve
the system during abnormal conditions. Inadequate training can also lead to hu-
man errors during the routine operation and maintenance work, which makes
the system more vulnerable to contingencies. Operators' lack of situational
awareness and failure to respond properly due to inadequate training was one
direct causes for Aug 14, 2003 Northeastern Blackout [1].
2. Technical Causes
² Operating di±culties. Most electric power systems have been integrated into
a big synchronous alternating current (AC) system covering a large area. The
electricity has been generated by power plants, transmitted through transmis-
sion and distribution networks and consumed by loads (customers) almost si-
multaneously because of no power "storage". All AC generators must run at
the same speed. The electricity °ows through the networks "freely" close to
the speed of light based on the laws of physics - along "paths of least resis-
tance" [1]. The generation and load must be balanced to maintain the sched-
6uled frequency. The reactive power supply and demand must be balanced to
maintain the scheduled voltage. The transmitted power through each transmis-
sion line must be within the transfer limits, both thermal and security related.
If there are congestions at the transmission lines, either load shedding, gener-
ation re-dispatching or generator rejection must be taken. The capacities of
generation and transmission must be always larger than load demand for the
possible disturbances. Those fundamental power system characters result in
di±culties in safe and reliable operation. Traditional regulated utilities owned
integrated systems, including generating plants, transmission and distrbution
networks. They considered those fundamental power system characters during
their planning and operating practices. After deregulation, generation, trans-
mission and distribution become separate entities and economy becomes their
primary concern with potential sacri¯ce of the security.
² Increased system complexity. Power system is one of the biggest and most com-
plex man-made systems. After deregulation, the original integrated utilities
have been divided into di®erent market participants and all of them seek their
own economic interests. New technologies, i.e., °exible AC transmission sys-
tems (FACTS) [17{19], can increase the system security and reliability if they
are applied properly. They also add operation and protection complexity. For
example, series compensation capacitors may cause the subsynchronous reso-
nance (SSR) problem [20] and di±culty in protection coordination because they
change the transmission line impedance character. New energy sources such as
wind energy, also add complexity and di±culty to the bulk power system op-
eration because of their remote location and intermittent load characters [21].
From the large complex system point of view, cascading outage probability is
7getting larger with the increase of the system size [22]. The system is lightly
nonlinear and has many dynamic modes of operation which makes it almost
impossible to determine all-inclusive control algorithm.
² More di±cult protection setting coordination. Protective relays are the most
important equipment to protect the power system elements from damage due
to internal and external causes and isolate the faulted elements with minimum
impact to other parts as soon as possible. Relay misoperation is believed to be
a contributing factor in 75 percent of the major disturbances in North America
[23]. Protection systems have been involved in 70 percent of the cascading
outages [24]. Current power systems are operating closer to their short circuit
limits. During abnormal conditions, the backup relays can not di®erentiate
the faults from non-fault conditions such as overload and large power swing.
Relay settings for the transmission lines, generators and under-frequency load
shedding may not be appropriately coordinated to reduce the likelihood and
consequence of cascading outages [1].
² Inadequate traditional security analysis. North American Electric Reliability
Council (NERC) requires "N ¡ 1 criterion" so that the power system can with-
stand the next worst contingency within 30 minutes (NERC Policy 2, Section
A) [1]. "N¡K criterion" (K ¸ 2) means the power system must withstand the
concurrent loss of K elements. It is too di±cult to perform "N ¡K" security
analysis because of the large number of possible contingency combinations. The
normal practice is to do detailed "N ¡ 1" security analysis in o®-line studies
and fast and limited "N ¡ 1" contingency analysis in real-time operation. Af-
ter outages of several facilities one by one during the abnormal conditions, the
outage infromation might not be reported to the related or neighboring control
8centers. The new contingency may neither be considered in real-time security
analysis, nor be done by o®-line studies. Therefore security analysis beyond
traditional "N ¡ 1" is needed.
² Lack of understanding of the cascades and unavailability of e®ctive support tools.
Several common factors characterise the cascading outages [1]: over-estimation
of reactive power support, inability to visualize events of the entire system,
failure to ensure the power system within safe limits, lack of "safety nets". Real-
time power system operators need support tools for understanding power system
cascade mechanism, performing o®-line studies and controlling power systems.
With dynamicly changing conditions, the real-time operating condition may
be totally di®erent from o®-line study and the complex hardware and software
infrastructure may fail to excute their desired functions. Thus power system
operators may operate their system in an insecure state unknowingly, just like
it was the case in the Aug 10, 1996 US-Western Blackout [10] and Aug 14, 2003
US-Northeastern Blackout [1].
3. Consequences
Cascading outage often causes large area blackouts and di®culties for system
restoration because it is a very slow process for all the generators to re-start and
re-synchronize and all the loads to be re-connectted through transmission and dis-
tribution networks. As a result, millions of people may not have power supply for
long time. The economic losses may be huge. The loss of Aug 10, 1996 US-Western
Cascading Outages was over $1.5 billion [1]. The estimated loss of Aug. 14, 2003
US-Northeast Cascading Outages was between $4 billion and $10 billion in US, and
$2.3 billion in Canada [1]. Besides the ecomonic losses, the modern society also faces
9disorders, crimes, loss of lives, living di±culties, mental su®erings, etc. due to the
loss of power supply.
Due to the above mentioned reasons, ¯nding solutions to detect, prevent and
mitigate cascading outages is one of the most di±cult and challenging tasks for power
system engineers and researchers, especially under current deregultated operating
constraints.
C. Current Research E®orts
The current power systems are operating in a mode for which they have not been
designed. Combined with the aging infrastructure, lack of investment, and inadequate
training of operating personnel, current power systems are more prone to cascading
outages. To mitigate the non-technical factors, more investments in both economic
and human resources are needed.
For the technical factors, di®erent research e®orts are aimed at understand-
ing and ¯nding ways to prevent and mitigate cascading outages. For example,
new technologies of superconductivity [25{27] and °exible AC transmission systems
(FACTS) [17{19] try to overcome the operating di±culties due to power system fun-
damental characters. Dynamic and probabilistic study of the cascade model [28]
tries to study the system complexity. To try to solve the protection problem, relay
hidden failure analysis [23, 29, 30], wide area back-up protection expert system [31],
and wide area monitoring, protection and control [32{38] are proposed. To overcome
the inadequate traditional security analysis, dynamic decision-event tree analysis [39]
is proposed. To overcome lack of understanding of the cascades and unavailability
of e®ective support tools, di®erent methods are proposed and used, such as visual-
ization of power system operating conditions [40], special protection scheme ('safety
10
nets') [41], self-healing system with the aid of multi-agent technology [42,43], steady
state simulation method [44, 45], etc. However, they are still far from being mature
and being readily used to solve the cascading outage problem.
Superconducting technologies [25{27] can be used in following applications: su-
perconducting magnetic energy storage (SMES), cables, fault current limiters, trans-
formers, generators, motors, etc. They can provide impoved e±ciency, smaller size,
reduced weight and increased system reliability compared with existing technologies.
Flexible AC transmission system (FACTS) [17{19] controllers can control important
power system variables such as: voltage, angle and impedance easily. They can pro-
vide bene¯ts such as increased transfer capability, added power °ow control, improved
power system stability, increased system security and reliabilty, etc. Those new tech-
nologies can provide some good solutions regarding the power system fundamental
characteristics and increase the system security and reliability. They are still con-
strained from large commercial useage by the maturity of technologies, complexity
and costs.
Dynamic and probabilistic study of the cascade model tries to understand the
power system cascade from probability, statistics and large complex system point of
view [28]. It analyzes the in°uence of load increase, number of line outage and system
size on blackout size and gives some probabilistic results. However, it does not give
useful solutions for the detection, prevention and mitigation of cascading outages.
Relay hidden failure analysis aims at exploring the undetected relay defect that
results in relay misoperation [23, 29, 30]. It can give some risk assessment. Relay
hidden failure is only one part of protection problems. Many relay misoperations are
not caused by relay hidden failure. To detect, prevent and mitigate cascading outages
much more work than relay hidden failure analysis is needed.
Wide area back-up protection expert system method takes advantage of the
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communication technology and arti¯cial intelligence [31]. When it gets a solid decision
and identi¯es the faulted component, it blocks the conventional backup protection to
avoid unnecessary trip. However, it is di±cult to make the solid decision and ¯nd the
exact faulted element during the complex situations and stressed conditions.
Wide area monitoring, protection and control tries to utilize advanced technolo-
gies of GPS synchronization, communication, computer, protection, control devices
and engineering practice to provide wide-area disturbance monitoring and emergency
control [32{38]. It can act as decentralized subsystems making local decisions based
on local meansurements and remote information and/or send preprocessed informa-
tion to higher hierarchial levels. The concept is still at its early stage.
Dynamic decision-event tree analysis is trying to ¯nd a rapid response scheme for
the N-K event with a low probability in advance [39]. It also ¯nds some dependent N-
K events with probability close to N-1 event. For any initial events, it tries to ¯nd all
subsequent possible events, make event trees and then store them. When such events
occur, it identi¯es if they match the stored event tree and activates the associated
emergency control to mitigate the events. Compared with the ¯xed special protection
scheme (or 'safety nets'), it is more °exible and can adapt to the dynamic changing
conditions. However, it is time consuming to create all possible dynamic event trees
and update them after conditions have changed. Another problem is associated with
the simulation model it uses. If the model is too simple, the method may be a bit
faster but the control results are not reliable thus it can not prevent or mitigate the
cascading outage. If the model is not simple, the method is very time consuming.
Visualization of power system operating conditions utilizes new technology to
represent complex power system operating conditions and conventional analysis re-
sults [40]. It helps power system operators to improve the situational awareness and
readiness for the alert and emergency conditions. However, visualization in itself does
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not bring any new technical solutions for the prevention and mitigation of cascading
outage.
Special protection scheme (or "safety net") activates automatically if a pre-
speci¯ed, signi¯cant contingency occurs [41]. When activated, such scheme involves
certain costs and inconvenience, but it can prevent some disturbances from getting
out of control. It is hardware based and responds to a limited set of conditions with
a limited number of possible actions. When the conditions are di®erent from the
pre-studied conditions, the special protection scheme may not be suitable.
Self-healing system with the aid of multi-agent technology wants to use the multi-
agent technology to provide self-healing and adaptive recon¯guration capabilities for
the power system based on the wide-area system vulnerability analysis [42, 43]. It
uses the multi-layer structure with independent multi-agent to ful¯ll its self-healing
goal. However, it is still at its conceptual design stage.
Steady state method has been used successfully in simulating the cascading se-
quence of 2003 US-Northeastern blackout [44] and the terrorist attack plan aimed at
¯nding the vulnerability of a power system [45]. It is also used by the Task Force to
benchmark the pre-cascade conditions of the Northeastern power system and make
important conclusion that the system was secure at 15:05EDT before the loss of
Harding-Chamberlin 345-KV line [1].Such methods can give some promising results
for the steady state and long term voltage and frequency stability problems. For the
dynamic conditions, the transient stability analysis is still needed.
As a summary, there is no comprehensive solution to the overall problem: to
detect, prevent and mitigate the cascading outages. The catastrophic social and
economical impacts of cascading outages, the high complexity of the cascading outage
problem, and the immature research e®orts and egineering practices urge engineers
and researchers to try their best to ¯nd solutions to help detect, prevent and mitigate
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cascading outages.
D. Research Objectives and Approach
To detect, prevent and mitigate cascading outages, one must know why and
how cascading outages occur so that some techniques and tools can be found to deal
with them. The causes of cascading outages and current research e®orts have been
described in previous sections. One important reason for the insu±ciencies of current
research e®orts is that they do not investigate the mechanism of cascading outages
completely so they can not provide e®ective tools accordingly.
This dissertation has two major objectives: a) to investigate the mechanism
of cascading outages to be able to point out e®ective techniques, b) to apply those
techniques in detection, prevention and mitigation of cascading outages. A breakdown
of research issues addressed in this dissertation is listed as follows:
² Investigate the mechanism of cascading outages.
² Develop a steady state control scheme for the early detection and prevention
of cascading outages based on the steady state progress character of cascading
outages.
² Develop a transient stability control scheme based on the transient progress
character of cascading outages.
² Develop an interactive scheme between system-wide and local monitoring and
control based on the interactive character of cascading outages.
² Evaluate the performance of the proposed control schemes.
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E. Summary
This dissertation works on one of the most di±cult and challenging problems in
the power system: detection, prevention and mitigation of cascading outages. The
causes and consequences of cadcading outages have been discussed. The mechanism
has been investigated. E®ective schemes and tools based on the mechanism to help
detect, prevent and mitigate cascading outages have been proposed in this disserta-
tion.
The dissertation is organized as follows. The fundamentals of the proposed ap-
proach are provided in Chapter II. Chapter III describes the comprehensive steady
state control scheme for early detection and prevention of cascading outages. The
whole procedure for evaluation, identi¯cation, prediction, control and applications of
associated tools are provided. The transient stability control scheme and its methods
are presented in Chapter IV. Chapter V describes the interactive scheme between
system-wide and local monitoring and control. The details of system monitoring and
control tool are introduced. Evaluation of those schemes is given in Chapter VI. The
conclusions of the dissertation are given in Chapter VII. References and Appendices
are attached in the end.
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CHAPTER II
FUNDAMENTALS OF THE PROPOSED APPROACH
A. Introduction
An overview of this dissertation is given in the ¯rst chapter. This chapter presents
the fundamentals of the proposed approach for detection, prevention and mitigation
of the power system cascading outages. In Section B, the de¯nitions of frequently used
terminologies are given. Section C describes some mechanism of cascading outages.
The proposed solution based on the assumed mechanism is given in Section D. A
summary is given in Section E.
B. De¯nitions of Terminologies
In this section, we will give some de¯nitions of frequently used terminologies in
this dissertation [1].
² Disturbance: "An unplanned event that produces an abnormal system condi-
tion".
² Contingency: "An unexpected failure or outage of a system component, such as a
generator, transmission line, circuit breaker, switch, or other electrical element.
A contingency may also include multiple components, leading to simultaneous
component outages".
² Outage: "The period during which a generating unit, transmission line, or other
facility, is out of service". A power outage is the loss of the electricity supply
to an area, irresponsive how small or big.
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² Cascade: "The uncontrolled successive loss of system elements triggered by an
incident".
² Stability: "The ability of an electric system to maintain a state of equilibrium
during normal and abnormal system conditions or disturbances".
² Transient stability: "The ability of an electric system to maintain synchronism
between its parts when subjected to a large disturbance and to regain a state of
equilibrium following that disturbance".
² Reliability: "The degree of performance of the elements of the bulk electric sys-
tem that results in electricity being delivered to customers within accepted stan-
dards and in the amount desired. Reliability may be measured by the frequency,
duration, and magnitude of adverse e®ects on the electric supply. Electric sys-
tem reliability can be addressed by considering two basic aspects of the electric
system: Adequacy and Security".
² Adequacy: "The ability of the electric system to supply the aggregate electrical
demand and energy requirements of customers at all times, taking into account
scheduled and reasonably expected unscheduled outages of system elements".
² Security: "The ability of the electric system to withstand sudden disturbances
such as electric short circuits or unanticipated loss of system elements".
² Blackout: A large-scale disruption in electricity supply, which is often a result
of cascading outages.
Vulnerability can be taken as a measure opposite to security. The system is
vulnerable if contingencies lead to an interruption of service to a part or the entire
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system. The element is vulnerable if contingencies or changing conditions lead to
violation of the limit, outage or mal-function of the element.
C. Mechanism
In general, cascading outages are not sudden events that human being can not de-
tect, prevent or mitigate. From the temporal framework, there is a process from slow
successive events to fast cascading outages. From the spatial framework, there are
interactions between the system-wide and local levels: local disturbances, i.e., faults
or relay misoperations stress the system condition, weak system condition causes
more local disturbances, further stressed system condition, till the cascading outages
unfold.
1. Stages of Cascading Outages
Normally there are two stages of cascading outages [46]. The ¯rst stage is steady
state progress stage: a period of slowly evolving successive events. The system oper-
ating conditions may get worse with several new disturbances following one another.
It can be approximated with steady state analysis. This stage is a very important
stage because the system operators may have enough time to evaluate the system
condition, identify some vulnerable contingencies, take some control to increase the
security level and prevent the possible cascading outages. The control cost is minimal
compared with the huge cost of cascading outages.
The second stage is transient progress stage: a fast transient process resulting
in cascading outages and ¯nally the collapse of the entire system. System dynamics
needs to be carefully considered. The common practice is to do transient stability
analysis. If faults occur and are not cleared within their critical clearing time (CCT),
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they will cause the transient stability problem. Some generators may run faster and
others may run slower. Thus the system synchronism is lost. Some generators and
transmission lines may be tripped by protective relays. If there were no e®ective
transient stability control scheme, cascading outages would occur.
Some cascading outages may only have fast transient progress stage, like the
Dec. 27, 1983 Sweden Blackout [6], July 2, 1996 US-Western Backout [10], and Mar.
11, 1999 Brazil Blackout [9]. The transient stability analysis and control must be
executed in such cases immediately.
2. Interaction Between the System-wide and Local Levels
There are interactions between the system-wide and local levels, especially system
security and local protection. The unfavorable interaction can go as follows: Lo-
cal disturbances, i.e., faults or relay misoperations, occur ¯rst and stress the system
condition. The stressed system condition may cause more local disturbances, either
faults because overloaded transmission lines sag to trees or relay misoperations due to
wrong settings, hidden failure, or being "fooled" by the non-fault conditions as faults.
More local disturbances stress the system condition more severely. Following this in-
teractive chain, cascading outages would occur. The favorable interaction can be like
this: Local disturbances have been contained within minimum impacted area. For
example, faults have been cleared timely and correctly. Any relay misoperations have
been prevented or corrected. Exact local disturbances information has been reported
to the control center. After local disturbances, the system security level decreases.
System-wide seurity analysis starts and identi¯es some vulnerable contingencies and
vulnerable parts. Possible control actions have been taken to enhance system security
level and some commands may be sent to vulnerable relays to increase relay security,
i.e., to block the backup protection from acting on power swing and overload condi-
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tions. After those proper system-wide and local interaction and control actions, the
power system goes to another secure operating state.
Protective relays take measurements from local current and voltage transformers
and from the remote end of the lines through communication channels. They work lo-
cally and independently, without knowing or considering the entire system condition.
They work in primary and backup modes to obtain redundancy in protection. If one
relay fails, another should detect the fault and trip the appropriate circuit breakers.
Some backup relays have signi¯cant "reach". Thus they may see non-fault conditions
such as line overloads, low voltage or stable swings as faults and trip the healthy
line [1]. That is one kind of relay misoperations. Another misoperation is that relays
refuse to operate when there is a fault within its primary reach, which occurs much
less than the former case. Relay settings are made by o®-line studies. They are not
updated frequently. With the changing of load level, power °ow pattern, and network
topology, those relay settings may not be proper unknowingly. For example, In 1965
US Northeastern Blackout, a backup relay misoperated to open one of ¯ve 230-KV
lines taking power north from a generating plant in Ontario to the Toronto area. That
was the direct cause of the following power swings resulting in a cascading outage
that blacked out much of the Northeast. It was because of a wrong setting which was
set 9 years earlier [30].
The system security analysis takes information, such as voltages, currents, topol-
ogy, controllers, etc., and does analysis for the whole system. It can know system
security level, identify the vulnerable contingencies and vulnerable parts within the
system, make proper control actions to increase system security level. It can also give
local relays guidance to prevent their misoperations when the system is in abnormal
condition .
If there were any control scheme making use of interaction between the system-
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wide and local levels, some cascading outages might have been prevented. However, it
is still an inmature research ¯eld and only a few references have discussed this [47{52].
3. Case Studies
We can take the Aug. 14, 2003 US-Northeastern Cascading Outages as an example
[1]. Let us look at both the cascading outage stages and interactions between system-
wide and local levels.
² Stage 1: steady state progress
12:08-14:14EDT, several transmission lines and one generator outage;
15:05-15:41EDT, three First Energy (FE) 345-KV line outage;
15:39-15:59EDT, collapse of 138-KV system;
16:05EDT, trigger issue: outage of Sammis-Star 345-KV line, started the cas-
cade;
16:05-16:09EDT, loss of two 345-KV lines and numberous 138-KV lines;
² Stage 2: transient progress
16:09-16:10EDT, loss of multiple generators;
16:10-16:13EDT, fully cascading outages
For the steady state progress stage, we can take the FirstEnergy System as an ex-
ample. Before the ¯rst 345-KV line (Harding-Chamberlin) was tripped at 15:05EDT,
the whole system was "N-1" secure eventhough the outages of several lines and one
generator reduced the security level. After Harding-Chamberlin line was tripped, the
system was "N-1" insecure. For the three 345-KV lines outage, after each line outage,
line loading increased at other lines and voltages decreased. We can see this from
Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 [1]. The collapse of 138-KV system was also one direct result.
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Fig. 3. FirstEnergy 345-KV line °ows
Fig. 4. Voltages on FirstEnergy's 345-KV lines: impacts of line trips
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The outage of Sammis-Star 345-KV line at 16:05EDT triggered the cascade.
But the system still remained stable till the trip of East Lima-Fostoria Central line at
16:09EDT. After that, big power swing occured and fast transient progress started.
We can see lots of tripping of lines, transformers and generators and fast spread of
the blackout area from the Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 [1]:
From Fig. 3 to Fig. 6 we can see that the steady state progress stage has a
comparatively longer period. If there were any early detection and preventon scheme,
it would detect and prevent the possible cascading outage at its early stage. This
would be the best choice to detect, pevent and mitigate cascading outages.
The investigation team found that the following control could have prevented
the blackout [1].
² At 15:41EDT, if 1000 MW load were shed in Cleveland-Akron area before the
third 345-KV line: Star-South Canton line tripping, it would have prevented
the subsequent tripping of the Sammis-Star line at 16:05:57EDT.
² At 16:05EDT, if 1500MW load were shed within Cleveland-Akron area before
the loss of Sammis-Star 345-KV line, the blackout could have been prevented.
Loss of the Sammis-Star line was the critical event leading to the widespread
cascade in the Northeastern system.
We can also analyze the interactions between system-wide and local levels. Out-
age of several transmission lines and one generator between 12:08EDT and 14:14EDT
stressed the system condition but did not put the system into "N-1" insecure state.
The outage of Harding-Chamberlin line at 15:05EDT put the system into "N-1" in-
secure state. It was caused by tree contact within normal line rating due to lack of
tree trimming. The following two 345-KV lines outages at 15:32EDT and 15:41EDT
were also caused by tree contact. Those disturbances stressed the system in abnormal
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Fig. 5. Cascade sequence
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Fig. 6. Rate of line and generators trips during the cascade
conditions. The underlying 138-KV lines were overloaded and tripped. The heavy
loading and low voltage condition caused Sammis-Star 345-KV line distance relay
to see a "zone 3" fault even though there was no fault, trip that line and trigger
the cascading outage. This can be seen from Fig. 7. As discussed above, proper
load shedding would have prevented the relay misoperation at Sammis-Star line and
averted the cascading outage.
We can also look at examples of July 2 & 3, 1996 US Western Disturbances [10].
On July 2, a protective relay on a parallel healthy 345-KV transmission line incorrectly
tripped that line, resulting in the loss of both lines which triggered the subsequent cas-
cading outage. On July 3, the same relay misoperated again. The possible cascading
outage was prevented because of operators' approprate load shedding action.
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Fig. 7. Sammis-Star 345-kV line trip
D. Proposed Solution
From the study of the cascading mechanism, we can con¯rm that from the
temporal framework, there are two stages of cascading outages: steady state progress
stage and transient progress stage. From the spatial framework, there are interactions
between system-wide and local levels. In this disseration, we propose three e®ective
control schemes to help detect, prevent, and mitigate the cascading outages.
Aimed at solving problems in the slow steady state progress stage, a steady
state analysis and control scheme is proposed in Chapter III. It is a new steady
state analysis method and control scheme for early detection and prevention of power
system cascading outages. It uses the Vulnerability Index (VI) and Margin Index
(MI) to evaluate the vulnerability and security of the individual system parts and
the operating condition of the entire system. For the given disturbance, it calculates
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the power °ow, evaluates the vulnerability and security, identi¯es the vulnerable
part, ¯nds the transmission line overload and bus voltage problems, and predicts the
possible successive events. The approach uses the control means based on methods
of Network Contribution Factor (NCF), Generator Distribution Factor (GDF), Load
Distribution Factor (LDF), and Selected Minimum Load Shedding (SMLS) for early
detection and prevention of cascading outages.
Aimed at handling system dynamic problems in transient progress stage, a tran-
sient stability control scheme based on potentianl energy boundary surface (PEBS)
method and analytical sensitivity of transient energy margin is proposed in Chap-
ter IV. It classi¯es the stability control means into two categories, admittance-based
control (ABC) and generator-input-based control (GIBC), and uses a comprehensive
method to analyze the contribution of each control means. The scheme can get the
optimal control from all the available transient stability control means by sensitivity
analysis and then verify it in the time-domain transient stability program. Fast and
accurate control goal can be obtained from this stability control scheme.
Aimed at making better use of interractions between system-wide and local levels,
an interactive scheme of system-wide and local monitoring and control is proposed in
Chapter V. This interactive scheme coordinates the system-wide and local monitoring
and control to ful¯ll this task. The proposed system tool is intended for installation
at the control center. It consists of routine and event-based security analyses, along
with security control schemes for expected and unexpected events. Routine security
analysis includes vulnerability analysis, and static and dynamic contingency analysis.
For the routine static and dynamic contingency analysis, contingencies which can
lead to an overload condition, voltage problem, transient stability, etc., will be found
and taken care of. Either preventive control actions need to be taken to prevent such
problems or emergency control needs to be activated if such contingencies have really
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happened. Vulnerability and security margin analysis of operating condition of the
entire system and individual element can be implemented. Vulnerable elements will
be identi¯ed and their relays need to be closely monitored. The event-based security
analysis is triggered when an unexpected disturbance occurs. It will indicate whether
the emergency control is needed to mitigate the transient stability problem or not.
The local monitoring and control tool is intended for installation at local substations.
It can provide system tool with correct local disturbance information and diagnostic
support. Thus, the system tool can have correct local information and take better
control to ensure the secure operation. The local tool can get the system security
status and monitoring command from the system tool.
E. Summary
The power system cascading outages are complex. Many factors can cause cas-
cading outages. There are some mechanism of cascading outages, which can give
researchers clues where focus research e®orts aimed at detecting, preventing and mit-
igating them. Steady state control scheme, transient stability control scheme, and
interactive scheme of system-wide and local monitorig and control are proposed in
this dissertation to help detect, prevent, and mitigate the cascading outages. They
will be described in detail in the rest chapters.
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CHAPTER III
STEADY STATE CONTROL SCHEME¤
A. Introduction
In general, cascading outages are not sudden events that human being can not
detect, prevent or mitigate. As described in Chapter II, normally there are two stages
of cascading outages. First, a period of slowly evolving successive events that can be
approximated with steady state analysis. The system operating conditions may get
worse with several new disturbances following one another. Second, after succession
of several major disturbances, there is a fast transient process resulting in cascading
outages and ¯nally the system collapses.
Steady state method has been used successfully to simulate the cascading se-
quence of 2003 US-Northeastern Blackout using rough information [44]. It was also
used by the Task Force to benchmark the pre-cascade conditions of the Northeastern
power system and make important conclusion that the system was secure at 15:05EDT
before the loss of Harding-Chamberlin line [1]. A similar method is used to simulate
terrorist attack plan to ¯nd the vulnerability of the system [45].
There are several successful cases of early detection and prevention of cascading
outages [10]: for example, on July 3, 1996, the Western Coast system operators
manually shed load to avoid the possible cascading outages when conditions were
similar to July 2. On Aug 26 and Oct 30, 1996, there were disturbances resulting in
line °ow above the transfer limit in New York Power Pool. The appropriate control
prevented the possible cascading outages if the next contingency had occurred.
¤Part of the material in this chapter is reprinted from \A new analysis method for
early detection and prevention of cascading events" by Hongbiao Song and Mladen
Kezunovic, Electric Power Systems Research, doi:10.1016/j.epsr.2006.09.010, c°2006
Elsevier B.V., with permission from Elsevier.
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Fig. 8. Basic °owchart for steady state control framework
This chapter gives a new approach for analysis of cascading outages, as well as
early detection and prevention scheme based on steady state analysis method for
the slow steady state progress stage. This method can be implemented to work
automatically or with operator supervision, and can serve as a decision-support tool
for real time operation or operator training purpose. The basic °owchart of this
approach can be seen in Fig. 8.
The proposed method framework is discussed as follows: First, the power system
is monitored to see whether there are any events or changing conditions during the
system normal operation. Second, the system conditions are evaluated by computing
the vulnerability index and margin index. Those indices can give speci¯c quantita-
tive measure of system vulnerability and security margin. Third, if the system is
determined to be secure (not vulnerable), the monitoring of the system continues.
Otherwise, the vulnerable parts of the system and vulnerable conditions are identi-
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¯ed, the possible voltage and overload problems if those vulnerable conditions occur
are predicted, the suitable control means to prevent or mitigate the problems are
identi¯ed, and the control means are activated when needed.
In Section B, comprehensive vulnerability index and margin index for generators,
buses and branches are provided to evaluate the power system operation, both at the
individual component and system level. In Section C, the topology processing and
operation index methods are given to identify the vulnerable parts of the power sys-
tem. A list of vulnerable system parts that need careful monitoring or special study is
created. In Section D, fast network contribution factor (NCF) method is used to pre-
dict the line overload and bus voltage problems for a given network event or assumed
contingency. Its results are veri¯ed by the full AC load °ow method. In Section
E, steady state control scheme based on network contribution factor (NCF), genera-
tor distribution factor (GDF), load distribution factor (LDF), and selected minimum
load shedding (SMLS) methods to prevent and mitigate possible cascading outages
is provided. Case Study and Summary are given in Section F and G respectively.
B. Evaluation by Vulnerability Index and Security Margin
Index
Power system operators need to know as precisely as possible the security con-
dition of the system operation. Thus they can take some control actions when the
system security is being or has been threatened.
"Security of a power system refers to the degree of risk in its ability to sur-
vive imminent disturbances (contingencies) without interruption of customer service.
Stability of a power system refers to the continuance of intact operation following a
disturbance" [53]. Vulnerability can be taken as a measure opposite to security. The
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system is vulnerable if contingencies lead to an interruption of service to a part or
the entire system. The element is vulnerable if contingencies or changing conditions
lead to violation of the element limit, outage or mal-function of the element.
Before the power system faces interruption of service or the element faces outage
or mal-function, some indices can be used to represent the degree of vulnerability and
security. Vulnerability index (VI) and margin index (MI) are proposed to represent
comprehensive and quantitative vulnerability and security information of the individ-
ual part and whole system [54]. Given a system with m generators, n buses, p lines
and q loads, we de¯ne the vulnerability index (VI) and Margin Index (MI) sets as
follows:
1. Vulnerability Index and Margin Index for Generators
V IPg;i =
WPg;i
2N
(
Pgi
Pgi;max
)2N (3.1)
V IQg;i =
WQg;i
2N
(
Qgi
Qgi;max
)2N (3.2)
V Igen loss;i =Wgen loss;ikgen loss;i (3.3)
V Igen =
mX
i=1
(V IPg;i + V IQg;i + V Igen loss;i) (3.4)
MIPg;i = 1¡ Pgi
Pgi;max
(3.5)
MIQg;i = 1¡ Qgi
Qgi;max
(3.6)
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2. Vulnerability Index and Margin Index for Buses
V IV;i =
WV;i
2N
(
Vi ¡ V schei
4Vi;lim )
2N (3.7)
V ILoadab;i =
WLoadab;i
2N
(rLoadab;i)
2N (3.8)
V Iload loss;i = Wload loss;ikload loss;i (3.9)
V Ibus =
nX
i=1
(V IV;i + V ILoadab;i + V Iload loss;i) (3.10)
MIV;i = 1¡ jVi ¡ V
sche
i
4Vi;lim j (3.11)
MILoadab;i = 1¡ rLoadab;i (3.12)
3. Vulnerability Index and Margin Index for Branches
V IPf;i =
WPf;i
2N
(
Pfi
Si;max
)2N (3.13)
V IQf;i =
WQf;i
2N
(
Qfi
Si;max
)2N (3.14)
V IQc;i =
WQf;i
2N
(
Qci
Q§
)2N (3.15)
V Iline angle;i =
Wline angle;i
2N
(
Lai
Lai;max
)2N (3.16)
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V IRelay;i =
WRelay;i
2N
((
1
dsr;i
)2N + (
1
drs;i
)2N) (3.17)
V Iline loss;i = Wline loss;ikline loss;i (3.18)
V Iline =
pX
i=1
(V IPf;i + V IQf;i + V IQc;i + V Iline angle;i + V IRelay;i + V Iline loss;i) (3.19)
MISf;i = 1¡ Sfi
Si;max
(3.20)
MIline angle;i = 1¡ Lai
Lai;max
(3.21)
MIRelay;i;sr = dsr;i ¡Kzj sin(¼=2¡ ®+ µd;sr)j (3.22)
MIRelay;i;rs = drs;i ¡Kzj sin(¼=2¡ ®+ µd;rs)j (3.23)
where
V Ixx: vulnerability index for di®erent parameters,
MIxx: margin index for di®erent parameters,
Wxx: weighting factor for di®erent parameters, based on the system operating
practice. If the operators are more concerned with one part, they can assign larger
weight to that part.
kx loss;i: loss ratio, between 0 and 1. 0: no loss; 1: complete loss;
N : 1 in general,
rLoadab;i: bus loadability,
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rLoadab;i =
Zth;i
ZL0;i
,
Zth;i: Thevenin equivalent system impedance,
ZL0;i: equivalent load impedance at steady state,
Pfi; Qfi; Sfi: line real, reactive and apparent power,
Qci: individual line charging,
Q§: total reactive power output of all generators, or total reactive power of the
whole system,
Lai: individual bus voltage angle di®erence at each line,
Lai;max: bus voltage angle di®erence limit at each line,
dsr;i; µd;sr: magnitude and angle of normalized apparent impedance seen by dis-
tance relay located at the sending end of that line and looking at the receiving end,
®: line impedance angle,
Kz: zone setting,
MIRelay;i;sr;MIRelay;i;rs: de¯ned as the distance from the apparent impedance
seen by transmission line distance relay to the relay protection zone circle; zero or
negative values mean the apparent impedance is at or within the protection zone
circle.
4. Vulnerability Index for the Whole System
The aggregate system vulnerability index (VI) can be presented by
V I = WgenV Igen +WbusV Ibus +WlineV Iline (3.24)
The larger the vulnerability index value, the more vulnerable the system condition.
We can learn about the system-wide vulnerability and security of individual system
elements from di®erent VI and MI values computed for various system conditions.
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5. Discussions about Vulnerability Index and Margin
Index
System Performance Index (PI) was originally proposed for automatic contingency
selection by ranking transmission line outages and generator outages in [55]. It only
considers the in°uences of line/generator outages on bus voltage and line real power
°ow, similar to Eq. 3.7 and 3.13.
Current power systems are being operated closer to its security limit due to eco-
nomic reasons. The in°uences of more parameters must be considered. The proposed
vulnerability index and margin index are more comprehensive because they are mod-
eling more parameters than traditional Performance Index. We just give some simple
explanations for some new parameters, such as loadability, line charging, bus voltage
angle di®erence, distance relay, etc.
To maintain the scheduled voltage, loadability and reactive power supply need
to be considered besides the voltage magnitude. Loadability is often associated with
voltage stability limit. There are good methods and references for loadability analysis
in [56]. Loadability is computed in this paper by using the Thevenin equivalent
impedance method [57].
The line charging in°uence is also considered by the proposed vulnerability index.
Some lightly loaded lines with high charging capacitance may contribute signi¯cantly
to the reactive power and voltage support. Their outages may decrease the reactive
power support or need generators to generate more reactive power. Outages of several
lightly loaded transmission lines may reduce the system security, which was one of
the key factors in the August 10, 1996 US-Western Blackout [10].
The bus voltage angle di®erence at each line is also an important index. We can
see this from the line power °ow and apparent impedance seen by line distance relay.
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For example, from the simplest lossless line model (represented with L only), real
power °ow through the transmission line can be represented by Psr =
VsVr
xsr
sin µsr.
A larger bus voltage angle di®erence means larger power transfer through that
line. If the lossless line model or short line model (represented with R & L) is used,
we can ¯nd that the normalized apparent impedance is only associated with the bus
voltages along the line.
Zd;sr =
Vs
Isr
=
Vs
(Vs ¡ Vr)=Zsr (3.25)
¹Zd;sr =
Zd;sr
Zsr
=
Vs
Vs ¡ Vr =
jVsj
jVs ¡ Vrj
6 µd;sr = dsr 6 µd;sr (3.26)
The larger the bus voltage angle di®erence, the smaller the normalized apparent
impedance, the more possible the case that the apparent impedance may fall into
the distance relay backup zone (zone 3 or zone 2 acting as backup) during non-fault
conditions such as power swing, overload and low voltage. The heavy loading and
low voltage condition caused the Sammis-Star 345-KV line distance relay to "see" a
zone 3 fault and trigger the Aug 14, 2003 Northeastern Blackout [1].
The selection of the weight factors can be based on the power system operating
practice. If the operators are more concerned with one part, they can assign larger
weight value to that part. For example, important tie-lines can be assigned larger
values than other transmission lines. Larger generators can be given larger values
than smaller generators.
Vulnerability index and margin index can be used for contingency ranking. They
can also be used to judge whether the system condition is vulnerable or not. For
example, for a normal ("N-1 secure") operating state, we can increase the system
loading till it is "N-1 insecure". We de¯ne the system vulnerability index value at
this point as the threshold for vulnerable criterion. If the system vulnerability index
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value is larger than this threshold, the system is vulnerable. This threshold will also
change with the changes in the network topology and generation/load pattern. The
fast network contribution factor (NCF) method will be used to approximate power
°ow results and calculate the vulnerability index and margin index.
C. Identi¯cation of the Vulnerable Parts in the System
After the system operating condition is identi¯ed as being vulnerable by exam-
ining the vulnerability index and margin index, the topology processing method and
operation index method can be used to identify the vulnerable parts of the system.
The single-line connection, single-line connected load bus, and double-line con-
nection can be identi¯ed from the topology processing method through bus-branch
incidence matrix A. The operation index method, including network contribution fac-
tors, contingency sti®ness index, and distance relay margin index, can be obtained
by the base power °ow condition and network information.
1. Single-line Connection
If one line is out, one or several buses will be isolated from the main part of the
system. This speci¯c line is called single-line connection, as represented with the line
i-j in Fig. 9a and lines i-j and j-k in Fig. 9b. Those single-line connections are used
to identify single-line connected load buses and avoid N-1 analysis at those lines.
2. Single-line Connected Load Bus
If the load bus is connected by one single-line, as represented with the bus j in
Fig. 9a and bus k in Fig. 9b, or if it is connected by more than one line but all of them
are single-line connections, as represented with the bus j in Fig. 9b, the load bus is
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Fig. 9. Single-line connection and its connected load bus
i j k l m
Fig. 10. Double-line connection
called single-line connected load bus. For those single-line connected load buses, the
maximum load is limited by the voltage drop along the line. This method is used for
voltage control and selected minimum load shedding (SMLS).
3. Double-line Connection
If two lines are out, one or several buses will be isolated from the main part of the
system. Those two speci¯c lines are called double-line connections. We can see them
represented in Fig. 10 where the outage of lines j-k and k-l isolates the bus k, and
outage of lines i-j and l-m isolates buses j, k and l. They are used to identify single-line
connections after one line outage and avoid the N-2 analysis at those two-line outage
combinations.
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4. Network Contribution Factor (NCF) Method
The Network contribuion factor (NCF) method was ¯rst proposed in [58]. Flow
network contribution factor (FNCF) and voltage network contribution factor (VNCF)
are obtained from the base °ow condition and network information. After a network
parameter variance, such as line on/o®, TCSC on/o®, SVC on/o®, etc., the branch
°ow and bus voltage variances can be obtained from FNCF and VNCF in a fast and
aproximate way.
a. Line Parameter Variance
Given an n-bus-l-branch system, A is the node-branch incidence matrix, Yp is the
primitive branch admittance matrix, Ybs is the node shunt capacitance matrix,
Yp = diag[y1 ¢ ¢ ¢ yl] (3.27)
Ybs = diag[ys1 ¢ ¢ ¢ ysn] (3.28)
Aij =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
1 if i is the sending node of branch j
¡1 if i is the receiving node of branch j
0 others
(3.29)
From the fast decouple power °ow (FDPF) [59], we know the approximate real
power equation,
P
E
= B
0
µ (3.30)
where,
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P , E, µ are the node real power injection, magnitude and angle of the bus voltage
respectively.
Assign
Y1 = ¡imag(Yp) (3.31)
Approximate the line real power °ow,
Pline »= Y1AT (Eµ) (3.32)
Node real power injection,
Pnode »= APline (3.33)
Bus voltage angle variance due to line parameter variance,
4µ = ¡(A(Y1 +4Y1)AT )¡1(A4Y1AT )µ (3.34)
Rewrite as
4µ = ¡X1(A4Y1AT )µ (3.35)
where
X1 = (A(Y1 +4Y1)AT )¡1 (3.36)
for single parameter variance at branch i,
4Y1 = diag[0 ¢ ¢ ¢4yi ¢ ¢ ¢ 0]
for multi-parameter variance, here only assume at branches i and j, more vari-
ances are similar,
4Y1 = diag[0 ¢ ¢ ¢4yi ¢ ¢ ¢4yi ¢ ¢ ¢ 0]
Line real power °ow variance,
4Pline = 4Y1AT (Eµ) + (Y1 +4Y1)AT )(E4µ) (3.37)
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Therefore, for single line i parameter variance,
for the line k, k 6= i, real power °ow change,
4Pline;k = ¡[A1k ¢ ¢ ¢Ank]X1Ki(yk4yi) (3.38)
where
Ki = [A1i ¢ ¢ ¢Ani]T
nX
j=1
(AjiEjµj) (3.39)
for the line i real power °ow change,
4Pline;i = (
nX
j=1
AjiEjµj=y
0
i ¡ [A1i ¢ ¢ ¢Ani]X1Ki)(y
0
i4yi) (3.40)
For single line outage, simply assign
4Pline;i = ¡Pline;i (3.41)
For multi-parameter variance, here we only two parameters variance for simple
example, assume lines i,j,
for line k, k 6= i; j, real power °ow change,
4Pline;k = ¡[A1k ¢ ¢ ¢Ank]X1(Ki4yi +Kj4yj)yk (3.42)
where
Ki = [A1i ¢ ¢ ¢Ani]T
nX
l=1
(AliElµl) (3.43)
Kj = [A1j ¢ ¢ ¢Anj]T
nX
l=1
(AljElµl) (3.44)
For the line i, j real power °ow change,
4Pline;i =
nX
l=1
AliElµl4yi ¡ [A1i ¢ ¢ ¢Ani]X1(Ki4yi +Kj4yj)yi (3.45)
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4Pline;j =
nX
l=1
AljElµl4yj ¡ [A1j ¢ ¢ ¢Anj]X1(Ki4yi +Kj4yj)yj (3.46)
for lines i, j outages, simply assign
4Pline;i = ¡Pline;i (3.47)
4Pline;j = ¡Pline;j (3.48)
b. Bus Parameter Variance
By the fast decoupled power °ow (FDPF),
4Q
E
= B"4E (3.49)
4E = (B")¡14Q
E
= X24BsE (3.50)
where,
X2 = (B
")¡1 (3.51)
4Q = 4BsE2 (3.52)
for single bus parameter variance at bus i,
4Bs = [0 ¢ ¢ ¢4ybs;i ¢ ¢ ¢ 0]T
bus k voltage variance
4Ek = X2;kiEk4ybs;i (3.53)
for bus multi-parameter variance at buses i, j
4Bs = [0 ¢ ¢ ¢4ybs;i ¢ ¢ ¢4ybs;j ¢ ¢ ¢ 0]T
bus k voltage variance
4Ek = X2;kiEk4ybs;i +X2;kjEk4ybs;j (3.54)
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c. Flow Network Contribution Factor (FNCF) and Voltage Network Contribution
Factor (VNCF)
For single paramter variance at line i, Flow Network Contribution Factor (FNCF)
can be de¯ned as follows:
for line k, k 6= i,FNCF is
Nf;k = ¡[A1k ¢ ¢ ¢Ank]X1Ki (3.55)
for line k, k = i,FNCF is
Nf;k =
nX
j=1
AjiEjµj=y
0
i ¡ [A1i ¢ ¢ ¢Ani]X1Ki (3.56)
where X1 and Ki as de¯ned in Eq. 3.36 and Eq. 3.39 respetively
Line k °ow variance
4Pline;k = Nf;kyk4yi (3.57)
For multi-paramter variance, here only take 2 parameters (lines i,j) variance as
simple example,
Line k °ow variance
4Pline;k = Nf;kyk(4yi + Kj
Ki
4yj) (3.58)
where Ki and Kj as de¯ned in Eq. 3.43 and Eq. 3.44 respectively.
For single paramter variance at bus i, Voltage Network Contribution Factor
(VNCF) can be de¯ned as follows:
for bus k, VNCF is
Nv;ki = X2;ki (3.59)
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bus k voltage variance is
4Ek = Nv;kiEk4ybs;i (3.60)
where X2 is de¯ned in Eq. 3.51.
For multi-paramter variance, here only take 2 parameters (buses i,j) variance as
simple example,
bus k voltage variance
4Ek = Nv;kiEk4ybs;i +Nv;kjEk4ybs;j (3.61)
The approximate variance for line k reactive power °ow is
4Qf;k ¼ Pf;k4µk (3.62)
where 4µ can be obtained from Eq. 3.35.
By using the FNCF and VNCF, we can ¯nd variance of the line °ow and variance
of the bus voltage due to network parameter change. Thus, line overload and bus low
voltage problems due to parameter change can be predicted.
5. Contingency Sti®ness Index
The contingency sti®ness index is proposed to represent the maximum distur-
bance at buses directly a®ected by a line outage contingency, normalized by the bus
equivalent admittance [60]. It is also used in this dissertation to identify vulnerable
lines whose outages may impact the security of the system. For the outage of line k
connecting buses i and j, it is de¯ned as
SIk =Maxf Sij
Y eqi
;
Sji
Y eqj
g (3.63)
where
45
Sij,Sji: apparent power °ow at the two ends of line k,
Y eqi ,Y
eq
j : equivalent admittance of buses i and j.
The contingencies with the sti®ness index values higher than a pre-determined
threshold need more attention.
6. Distance Relay Margin Index
Eq. 3.22 and 3.23 de¯ne the distance relay margin indices from both ends of the
line. If either one is negative, that means, the apparent impedance phasor falls into
the relay protection zone. The single-line connection, single-line connected load bus,
and double-line connection can be identi¯ed from the topology processing method
through bus-branch incidence matrix A. The °ow and voltage network contribution
factors, contingency sti®ness index, and distance relay margin index can be obtained
by the base power °ow condition and network information.
D. Prediction of the Overload and Voltage Problems
For a given network event or assumed network contingency, we can ¯rst use fast
network contribution factor (NCF) method to get approximate power °ow results.
Then associated margin and vulnerability indices can be obtained. If the operation
condition is judged vulnerable, the vulnerable elements will be identi¯ed by the topol-
ogy processing and operation index methods. Line overload or voltage problems can
be predicted by the °ow and voltage network contribution factor method. The ¯nal
results will be veri¯ed by the full AC power °ow method. If the contingency is a loss
of generator or load, new AC power °ow needs to be run instead.
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E. Control Methods and Automatic Control Scheme
If line overload and/or low voltage problems occur after the event, associated
control needs to be taken to solve such problems. The proposed steady state control
scheme is based on methods of network contribution factor (NCF), generator dis-
tribution factor (GDF), load distribution factor (LDF) and selected minimum load
shedding (SMLS). GDF and LDF are proposed in [61] for supplemental charge al-
location in the transmission open access. In this dissertation, they are used for line
overload relief based on their contribution to the line °ow. Here we give the brief
description of those methods and related automatic control scheme.
1. Network Contribution Factor (NCF) and NCF Control
For a given system, there are some available network control means [53,62{65], such
as line switching, TCSC control, SVC control, shunt capacitor/reactor switching, etc.
For the line overload problem, choose Eq. 3.57 or 3.58 to get the wanted overload
relief. For the bus voltage problem, choose Eq. 3.60 or 3.61 to get the bus voltage
adjustment.
2. Generator Distribution Factor (GDF) and GDF Control
Let the gross nodal power P gi °owing through node i (when looking at the in°ows)
be de¯ned by
P gi =
X
j2®ui
jP gijj+ PGi for i = 1; 2; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; n (3.64)
where
®ui is the set of nodes supplying power and directly connected into node i, and
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PGi is the power generation injected into node i. Rewrite it as:
AuPgross = PG (3.65)
where Au is the upstream distribution matrix with its (ij)
th element de¯ned by
[Au]ij =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
1 for i = j
¡jPji=Pjj for j 2 ®ui
0 others
(3.66)
where
Pji is the real power °ow from node j to node i in line j ¡ i; Pj is the total real
power injected into node j. Then we have
P gi =
nX
k=1
[A¡1u ]lkPGk for i = 1; 2; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; n (3.67)
Finally the contribution of each generator k to line i¡ j °ow can be calculated
by
P gij =
nX
k=1
Dgij;kPGk for j 2 ®ui (3.68)
Dgij;k = P
g
ij[A
¡1
u ]ik=P
g
i (3.69)
Dgij;k can be called the generation distribution factor (GDF). They are always
positive or zero. For the line i-j overload problem, simply choose the most and least
contributing generator pair, decrease the output of the most contributing generator
and increase that of the least contributing one. The generator adjustment amount
will be restricted by generator upper/lower limit and the line transfer limit. When
those limits are hit and the line overload problem still exists, the second most and
least contributing generator pair will be chosen till the overload problem is solved.
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3. Load Distribution Factor (LDF) and LDF Control
Similarly, let the gross nodal power P ni (looking from out°ows) be de¯ned by
P ni =
X
j2®di
jP nijj+ PLi for i = 1; 2; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; n (3.70)
where
®di is the set of nodes supplied directly from node i, and PLi is the load at node
i. Similarly, rewrite it as:
AdPnet = PL (3.71)
where
Ad is the downstream distribution matrix with its (ij)
th element de¯ned by
[Ad]ij =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
1 for i = j
¡jPji=Pjj for j 2 ®di
0 others
(3.72)
P ni =
nX
k=1
[A¡1d ]lkPLk for i = 1; 2; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; n (3.73)
Finally the contribution of each load k to line i¡ j °ow can be calculated by
P nij =
nX
k=1
Dnij;kPLk for j 2 ®di (3.74)
Dnij;k = P
n
ij[A
¡1
d ]ik=P
d
i (3.75)
Dnij;k can be called the load distribution factor (LDF). They are always positive
or zero. If the load can be reduced by an agreement, it can be taken into the LDF
control. For the overload line, simply choose one or several most contributing loads
to shed to solve the overload problem.
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4. Selected Minimum Load Shedding (SMLS)
If the power °ow diverges due to a line outage but without loss of system integrity,
normally some load shedding scheme needs to be activated to make the power °ow
converge. If the power °ow converges, some bus voltages are lower than their lower
limits. Load shedding also needs to be taken if other control means can not solve the
problem. The following are the steps for SMLS.
Step 1. Check whether the system has single-line connected load buses or not. If
bus j is the single-line connected load bus, calculate the approximate voltage
drop along line i¡ j:
dVij ¼ PijRij +QijXij (3.76)
where
Pij; Qij: real and reactive part of line i¡ j °ow,
Rij; Xij: resistance and reactance of line i¡ j.
If dVij > dVij;lim, check whether there is shunt reactor or capacitor at this
bus. If there is a shunt reactor, switch o® the shunt reactor. If there is a
shunt capacitor, switch on the capacitor. Then recalculate the dVij. If the
voltage di®erence is still larger than the limit, shed the load at this bus.
kratio = dVij;lim=dVij (3.77)
kshed = 1¡ kratio (3.78)
After the load shedding at single-line connected load buses is performed, run
power °ow. Check whether power °ow converges or not. If it diverges, in-
crease the load shedding ratio. Otherwise, check whether there is low voltage
problem. If yes, go to Step 2. If no, stop.
50
Step 2. Check whether the low voltage bus is single-line connected load bus, and if
so, continue load shedding at this bus. If it is not a single-line connected load
bus, choose the neighboring buses and voltage sensitive buses to shed their
loads to bring the bus voltage within the limit.
Step 3. Choose the control area or system-wide load shedding based on an available
control scheme.
Step 4. Compare di®erent load shedding results, and choose the minimum load shed-
ding as the ¯nal control means.
5. A Scheme for Detection and Prevention of Cascading Outages
The conventional approach is for the lines experiencing overload conditions for a
long time to be tripped o® by relays. Under frequency load shedding will be activated
when the demand is larger than supply and the system frequency keeps decreasing.
So will the under voltage load shedding during low voltage conditions if there exists
such control scheme.
During the stressed system conditions, if the line outage decreases the security
level and causes more cascading outages and low voltage problem, that line should
not be tripped. Other overload relief means should be activated. We have de¯ned the
steady state control scheme combined with network contribution factor (NCF) and
generator distribution factor (GDF) methods. If these two methods can not solve the
overload condition, load control based on load distribution factor (LDF) method and
selected minimum load shedding (SMLS) will be inacted. For the low bus voltage
problem, the minimum load shedding will be undertaken instead of the control area
or system-wide load shedding. Fig. 11 is the °ow chart for the proposed automatic
control scheme.
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Fig. 11. Flowchart of the control scheme
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The basic procedure is explained as follows.
Step 1. Initialize the computation;
Step 2. Run the base power °ow;
Step 3. Evaluate system vulnerability and security by VI and MI indices;
Step 4. Check whether an event has occurred or not. If no event occurs, Stop; if an
event occurs, update system information;
Step 5. Check whether system islands have been formed or not. If system islands are
not formed, go to Step 8;
Step 6. Otherwise, identify the islands, record isolated bus/generator/branch, and
record generator/load loss in each island;
Step 7. Choose major island for analysis, update system information;
Step 8. Identify the single-line connected load buses;
Step 9. Run the power °ow;
Step 10. If power °ow converges, go to Step 12;
Step 11. Otherwise, use selected minimum load shedding (SMLS) scheme to make
power °ow converge, and update generator/load pattern;
Step 12. Evaluate vulnerability and security by VI and MI;
Step 13. Check whether there is any bus voltage V and line °ow Sf violation. If there
is no V violation, go to Step 15;
Step 14. Otherwise, activate bus voltage control;
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Step 15. Check whether there is line °ow violation, if not, stop;
Step 16. Otherwise, executed associated NCF control to solve the violation problem;
Step 17. If NCF method solves the problem, n NCF = n NCF + 1, if n NCF <
k NCF , go to Step 4, else, go to Step 19; if NCF does not solve the problem,
choose the best available NCF control;
Step 18. Execute GDF control. If GDFmethod solves the problem, n GDF = n GDF+
1, if n GDF < k GDF , go to Step 4, else, go to Step 19; if GDF does not
solve the problem, choose the best available GDF control, go to Step 19;
Step 19. Check whether LDF control is available or not. If not, go to Step 20; Other-
wise, check if LDF method solves the problem, if yes, n LDF = n LDF +1,
if n LDF < k LDF , go to Step 4, else, go to Step 20; if LDF does not solve
the problem, choose the best available LDF control, go to Step 20;
Step 20. Final control. If the original violation is only voltage (V ) violation, use the
selected minimum load shedding scheme to bring V within limit; otherwise,
check whether removing overloaded line can solve the overload problem or
not, if yes and there is no other violations, remove the line; otherwise, use
the selected minimum load shedding scheme to eliminate any violation.
Note: k NCF , k GDF and k LDF are pre-de¯ned numbers. If n NCF , n GDF
and n LDF are larger than those values, the ¯nal control is used. Otherwise, the
associated NCF, GDF and LDF control are used.
F. Case Study
We use the IEEE One Area 24-bus system as the study system [66]. Fig. 12 gives
the system con¯guration. Detailed system data is shown in Appendix B.
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Fig. 12. IEEE One Area RTS-96 24-bus system
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For the vulnerability index calculation, we simply assign all weights as 1, the line
bus voltage angle di®erence limits as 40 degrees, PQ bus voltage magnitude limits as
1.0 p.u., the base power as 100MVA. Then we sum all individual vulnerability index
values of generators, buses and lines and get the separate summary of vulnerability
index values.
Bus voltage magnitude lower limit is 0.9 p.u.. The transmission line thermal limit
is assumed to be the line rate A setting in the standard IEEE power °ow data. Bus
voltage drop limit along the transmission line is 0.10 p.u.. For the margin index, we
just choose margin indices of generator real and reactive power outputs, bus voltage,
bus loadability, line °ow, line angle, and line distance relay for simple demonstration.
Here we give three study cases. The Case 1 is the outage of special cable line L10
(B6-10). There will be a serious low voltage problem if the compensation reactor at
bus 6 is not switched o®. In reality, the system can not operate at such a low voltage
level. That means, voltage collapse may happen and the system may have cascading
event if no appropriate control. The Case 2 is the outage of lines L6 (B3-9) and L27
(B16-17) which results in power °ow divergence. Voltage collapse and cascading event
may happen before the power °ow divergence. The Case 3 is the outage of lines L25
(B15-21) and L26 (B15-21) which results in an overload on two other lines. System
islanding and cascading outage may occur if there is no appropriate control. The
proposed automatic cascading events prevention and mitigation scheme gives very
good results for these cases.
Case 1. Outage of cable line 10 (B6-10)
If the reactor at bus 6 is not switched o®, the bus 6 voltage magnitude is 0.6726
p.u. Load shedding is taken to increase the bus 6 voltage. Even if 99% of the total
system load is shed, the bus 6 voltage magnitude is still as low as 0.8701 p.u.. If the
reactor at bus 6 is switched o®, its voltage magnitude is 0.8555 p.u.. If 16.2% of the
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Table II. Vulnerability and margin indices of di®erent conditions
Case 1A Case 1B Case 1C Case 1D Case 1E
VI values 7.863 23.369 12.122 14.773 12.059
MI values 4.063 3.619 3.800 3.981 3.807
total system load, that is, 461.7 + j93.96 MVA, is shed, the bus 6 voltage magnitude
is increased to 0.90 p.u..
The new control scheme ¯rst ¯nds that bus 6 is a single-line connected load bus by
L5 (B2-6). Second, it searches whether there is an available shunt reactor or capacitor
at that bus. Then it ¯nds and switches o® the shunt reactor. Third, it calculates the
approximate voltage drop along this single line L5 (B2-6) based on the original load
level at bus 6. 4V26 = P26R26 +Q26X26 = 1:36£ 0:05 + 0:28£ 0:192 = 0:122 > 0:10
p.u. To bring the bus 6 voltage within limit, the selected minimum load shedding
(SMLS) is run and shedding 6.84% of the original load at bus 6 can bring the bus
6 voltage be 0.90 p.u.. Thus, only 9.3+j1.92 MVA load is shed. Compared with
the total system load shedding of 461.7 + j93.96 MVA obtained by the conventional
method, the proposed approach is only about 2.02% of the conventional method.
Table II gives a simple summary of vulnerability and margin indices for di®erent
conditions. The Case 1A is the base power °ow case without L10 outage. The Case
1B is with L10 outage. The Case 1C is the L10 outage with reactor switched o® at
B6. The Case 1D is the L10 outage, reactor switched o®, and 16.2% system load
shedding. The Case 1E is similar as the Case 1D but with only 6.84% load shedding
at B6. Here we take 100MVA load loss as 1.00 in the VI calculation.
The base Case 1A has the smallest VI and largest MI. The Case 1B has the
largest VI and smallest MI. The Case 1C decreases the vulnerability and increases
the security level compared with the Case 1B after the shunt reactor is switched o®.
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Table III. Solution methods for lines L6(B3-9) & L27(B16-17) outages
Procedure Result
Method 1 (191.52+j38.976) MVA system load shedding Power °ow converges, with B3 & B24 voltage as
0.6122 p.u. and 0.6032 p.u.
Method 2 (1311.6+j266.92) MVA system load shedding Power °ow converges, with B3 & B24 voltage as
0.9135 p.u. and 0.90 p.u.
Proposed
Method
(82.836+j17.027) MVA load shedding at B3 Same results as Method 2, but only 6.32% shed-
ding amount of Method 2.
The Case 1D increases the security level but increases vulnerability because of large
load shedding. The Case 1E is the optimal one because it increases the security while
requiring a minimum load shedding.
Case 2. Outage of lines L6 (B3-9) and L27 (B16-17)
Power °ow diverges because of the outage of those two lines. By the conventional
method, after 6.72% of the total system load (191.52+j38.976 MVA) is shed, the power
°ow converges. But the bus voltage magnitudes at bus 3 and 24 are 0.6122 p.u. and
0.6032 p.u. respectively. Then 46.02% of the total system load (1311.6+j266.92 MVA)
needs to be shed to make the voltages at bus 3 and 24 to be 0.9135 p.u. and 0.90
p.u. respectively.
The new scheme ¯rst identi¯es that bus 3 is a single-line connected load bus
although it is connected by two lines. Second, it concludes that there is no available
shunt reactor or capacitor at bus 3. Third, it determines that the approximate voltage
drop along this line is 0.177 p.u., which is larger than the 0.1 p.u. limit. Fourth,
it runs the selected minimum load shedding and ¯nds that if 46.02% of the load
(82.836+j17.027 MVA ) is shed at bus 3, the power °ow will converge and there is no
any limit violation. The amount of load to be shed determined by the new method
is only 6.32% of what was determined by the conventional method. The results of
those methods can be shown in Table III.
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Case 3. Outage of lines L25 (B15-21) and L26 (B15-21)
Assume that line L25 is tripped due to a fault and the parallel line L26 is also
tripped due to relay misoperation, which is a possible case. The apparent °ows at
L28 (B16-17) and L30 (B17-18) are 7.4453 p.u. and 5.6395 p.u. respectively. The
two lines will be overloaded because both of their thermal limits are 5.00 p.u..
L28 and L30 will be tripped due to an overload. Area A will be disconnected
from the main part of the system. Before the islanding, there is a total of 7.57+j1.446
p.u. °ow transferred from Area A to Area B through three tie-lines: L25, L26 and
L28. From the steady state analysis viewpoint, to make the balance between power
demand and supply, at least 7.57 p.u. of real power generation needs to be reduced at
Area A. At Area B and Area C, the load shedding amount of 698.72+j142.13 MVA,
which constitutes 27.76% of the total load, is needed to make the power °ow converge
without any limit violation. If we consider the system dynamics, the system may lose
the stability and cascading outage may occur.
The new method ¯rst ¯nds the L28 and L30 overload after outage of L25 and
L26. Second, it tries to use the NCF and GDF control methods to solve the overload
problem instead of tripping L28 and L30. Since there is no contributing NCF method
available, GDF control method is pursued. GDF method ¯nds two generator pairs
which contribute most and least to the overload of L28 and L30 respectively, G10 (at
B22) and G1 (at B1) for L28, and G8 (at B18) and G2 (at B2) for L30. In Step 1,
GDF control chooses to increase the real power output of G1 and decrease that of
G10 by the same amount to solve the L28 overload. GDF control increases the real
power output of G2 and decreases that of G8 to solve the L30 overload. The outputs
of G1 and G2 can only be increased to their upper limits 2.304 p.u.. By this step,
the °ow at L30 is 4.7971 p.u. and the overload is solved. But the °ow at L28 is 6.332
p.u., which is still larger than 5.00 p.u. thermal limit. In Step 2, generator pair G10
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Table IV. Solution methods for lines L25(B15-21) & L26(B15-21) outages
Procedure Result
Base condi-
tion
L28 & L30 overload (7.4453 p.u. & 5.6395
p.u. vs. their 5 p.u. limit)
Outage of L28 & 30, system islanding and cascading;
or (698.72+j142.13) MVA load shedding to save the
system
Step 1 Down G10 & Up G1 to solve L28 overload;
Down G8 & Up G2 to solve L30 overload;
L30 overload solved, L28 overload decreased because
of G1 upper limit
Step 2 Down G10 & Up G3 to solve L28 overload; L28 overload decreased because of L11 transfer limit
Step 3 Down G10 & Up G4 to solve L28 overload; Solve
Step 4 Veri¯ed with AC load °ow Solve, no violation.
(at B22) and G3 (at B7) is chosen to solve the L30 overload. There is a thermal
limit of 1.75 p.u. at L11 (B7-8). Thus the increase of G3 has a limit. By taking this
step, the °ow at L28 is brought to 5.764 p.u., which is larger than 5.00 p.u. limit.
In Step 3, generator pair G10 and G4 (at B13) is chosen and L28 overload is ¯nally
solved. By applying the steady state analysis method, the overload problem is solved
by using the NCF and GDF methods. The possible cascading outage is prevented.
The results of those methods can be shown in Table IV.
G. Summary
This chapter proposes a new approach to detect and prevent cascading outages
at their initial stage that can be assessed using the steady state analysis method. For
each operating state, the system vulnerability and security are evaluated based on the
vulnerability and margin indices. The vulnerable parts of the system can be identi¯ed
based on the topology processing and operational index methods. The next possible
event can be predicted based on the analysis. If there are any problems of islanding,
transmission line overload, bus voltage violation, or distance relay misoperation, new
control means based on network contribution factor (NCF), generator distribution
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factor (GDF), load distribution factor (LDF) and selected minimum load shedding
(SMLS) methods will be taken to prevent the possible cascading events. Case studies
using the IEEE 24-bus test system show good results of the proposed approach.
The proposed approach is based on the steady state analysis method. It gives an
understanding how cascading outages progress in early stages and provides control
means for preventing further unfolding of the cascade. The power system cascading
events are very complex and a comprehensive analysis needs also to consider the
system dynamics, which will be included in the following chapters.
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CHAPTER IV
TRANSIENT STABILITY CONTROL SCHEME¤
A. Introduction
The steady state control scheme in Chapter III gives promising results for early
detection and prevention of cascading outages in their early stage. For the transient
pogress stage and system dynamic conditions during and after big disturbances (i.e.,
faults), transient stability analysis must be executed. If it ¯nds that the system will
lose the stability before it can move to a new steady state operation point, transient
stability control must be used to preserve the system.
Transient stability control is more di±cult in current deregulated environment
than before. This is due to the frequently changing generation/load patterns and net-
work topology during normal power system operations. Competitive market, steady
increasing load, and limited transmission capacity stress the power system closer to
the security margin. Several unexpected disturbances may put the system into an
emergency state, resulting in cascading outages or system collapse if there are no
fast and appropriate stability controls in action. Conventional o®-line study and pre-
de¯ned stability control scheme can no longer adapt to the fast changing conditions.
The need for fast and adaptive stability analysis and stability control is more visible.
Lyapunov-like direct methods have the advantages of speed and security margin
information. Therefore, many good results have been obtained by many researchers'
continuous e®orts. There are some useful investigations in the transient stability
analysis by using analytical sensitivity of the transient energy margin [67{69]. How-
¤Part of the material in this chapter is reprinted with permission from \Stability
control using PEBS method and analytical sensitivity of the transient energy mar-
gin" by Hongbiao Song and Mladen Kezunovic, Presented in 2004 IEEE PES Power
Systems Conference and Exposition, New York, Oct. 2004, vol. 2, pp. 1153-1158.
c°2004 IEEE.
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ever, these interesting papers focus more on the stability analysis by using sensitivity
information. Stability control is discussed less.
This chapter proposes the transient stability control scheme using PEBS method
and analytical sensitivity of the transient energy margin. It classi¯es current stabil-
ity control means into two categories, admittance-based control (ABC) means and
generator-input-based control (GIBC) means. The proposed method can quickly ¯nd
the parameter variance of each stability control means for the transient stability anal-
ysis. Analytical sensitivity of the transient energy margin is used to ¯nd the most
suitable control to make the possibly unstable system stable. One of the Lyapunov
methods, potential energy boundary surface (PEBS) method, is used. Some simula-
tion results are provided.
In Section B, the background of transient stability analysis methods is given.
The proposed transient stability control classi¯cation is discussed in Section C. The
sensitivity analysis of transient energy margin is presented in Section D. Section
E describes the transient stability control scheme. Case Study and Summary are
provided in Sections F and G respectively.
B. Transient Stability Analysis Methods
As de¯ned in Chapter II, transient stability refers to the ability of an electric
power system to maintain synchronism between its parts when subjected to a dis-
turbance and to regain a state of equilibrium following that disturbance. Transient
stability problem is one of the most important problems to ensure the stable and
secure operation of power systems. It has been the dominant stability problem on
most power systems and many power system cascading outages have been caused
by transient instability [70]. There are lots of books and papers covering transient
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stability analysis and control [5, 51,53,67,68,70{92].
In general, the dynamics of the power system state can be described by a set of
di®erential equations (power swing equations):
_x = f(x; u) (4.1)
where
x is a vector of state variables, including variables associated with generators
and excitation systems.
u is an input vector, including stator and ¯eld voltages, and mechanical power
input of each generator in the system.
The objective is to study the stability of the dynamic system described by the dif-
ferential equations from the steady state operating point as the starting point. It can
provid time-domain information related to variances in rotor angles, speeds, torques,
voltages, currents, and powers of generators as well as the variances in volages and
power °ows in the transmission network during and after the disturbance, depending
on the modeling details of the system.
Nomally there are three types of solution methods: time-domain methods, Lypunov-
like direct methods and hybrid methods. Time domain methods have the advantages
of handling any type of power system modeling, providing time-wise description of
the dyamic information, and having the highest accuracy. Their disadvantages are
time-consuming aspect and lack of sensitivity analysis. Lypunov-like direct meth-
ods eliminate most of the time domain simulations, by inferring information about
transient stability from the system when entering its post-fault phase. They can also
provide stability margin and sensitivity analysis for preventive control. The results
of direct methods are not as accurate and reliable as time-domain methods. Hybrid
methods try to incorparate the transient energy calculation into the time-domain
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simulations. They are not used as frequently as the former two methods.
In this dissertation, we use one direct method, potential energy boundary surface
(PEBS) method, and analytical sensitivity of transient energy margin for transient
stability analysis and control. Its results will be veri¯ed by the most accurate time-
domain method. First, we will introduce the Lypunov-like transient energy function.
PEBS method will be described next.
Let us use the classical model of machine for an example, in the Center of Angle
(COA) reference [67], power swing equations can be writen as:
_µi = ~!i (4.2)
Mi _~!i = Pi ¡ Pei ¡ Mi
MT
PCOI (4.3)
where
Pei =
nX
j=1;j 6=i
[Cij sin(µi ¡ µj) +Dij cos(µi ¡ µj)] (4.4)
Pi = Pmi ¡ E2iGii (4.5)
PCOI =
nX
i=1
(Pi ¡ Pei) (4.6)
MT =
nX
i=1
Mi (4.7)
Cij = EiEjBij (4.8)
Dij = EiEjGij (4.9)
Cij, Dij : real and reactive parts of the admittance matrix. They change at
pre-fault, during-fault and post-fault conditions.
By linear path-dependence assumption, we can get the transient energy function
as follows:
Vµ;~! = VKE + VPE (4.10)
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The kinetic energy function is:
VKE =
1
2
nX
i=1
Mi~!
2
i (4.11)
The potential energy function is:
VPE = ¡
nX
i=1
P pfi (µi ¡ µsi )¡
n¡1X
i=1
nX
j=i+1
[Cpfij (cos µij ¡ cos µsij)¡ ¯ijDpfij (sin µij ¡ sin µsij)]
(4.12)
As for the transient stability, the critical energy is the potential energy at the
controlling unstable equilibrium point (Controlling UEP) since it represents the max-
imal energy that the system can absorb. If the total energy at the clearing time
is larger than this one, the associated machine(s) will lose the synchronism. Thus,
transient energy margin can be calculated by following equation:
4V = V (µu; ~!u)¡ V (µcl; ~!cl) (4.13)
Since at Controlling UEP, we assume ~!u = 0, we can get transient energy margin
4V by following equation:
4V =¡ 1
2
Meq(~!
cl
eq)
2 ¡
nX
i=1
P pfi (µ
u
i ¡ µcli )¡
n¡1X
i=1
nX
j=i+1
[Cpfij (cos µ
u
ij ¡ cos µclij)¡ ¯ijDpfij (sin µuij ¡ sin µclij)]
(4.14)
where,
¯ij =
µui +µ
u
j ¡µsi¡µsj
µuij¡µsij (in linear dependence direction),
µcl: rotor angle positions at the end of disturbance (fault clearing time),
µu: rotor angle positions of Controlling UEP,
Meq =McrMsys=(Mcr +Msys),
~!cleq = ~!
cl
cr ¡ ~!clsys,
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Meq: inertia constants of the equivalent generator,
Mcr: inertia constants of the critical generators,
Msys: inertia constants of the rest generators,
~!eq: speed of inertia centers of the equivalent generator at the end of a distur-
bance,
~!cr: speed of inertia centers of the critical generators at the end of a disturbance,
~!sys: speed of inertia centers of the rest of generators at the end of a disturbance.
Potential energy boundary surface (PEBS) method is based on physical intuition
[74]. From the post-fault stable equilibrium point (SEP) draw a number of rays in
each direction in the angle space with Center of Angle (COA) as reference. Along each
ray, search for the ¯rst point where the potential energy achieves a local maximum.
Join those points of µ to form the boundary surface of interest (stability boundary).
Mathematically, PEBS can be obtained by setting the directional derivative of the
potential energy Vp(µ) to zero, as follows:
[f(µ)]T ² (µ ¡ µs) = 0 (4.15)
It can be rewriten as:
nX
i=1
(µi ¡ µsi )fi(µ) = 0 (4.16)
fi(µ) = ¡@VPE(µ)
@µi
= Pi ¡ Pei ¡ Mi
MT
PCOI (4.17)
Eq. 4.17 uses the post-fault con¯guration (admittance matrix).
Inside the PEBS, the [f(µ)]T ² (µ ¡ µs) is smaller than 0 and outside the PEBS
it is larger than 0. So [f(µ)]T ² (µ¡ µs) changing sign from '-' to '+' is the indication
of PEBS crossing. Detailed description can be found in [73].
Fig. 13 gives the relationship among unstable equilibrium point (UEP), PEBS
crossing point, exit point, Controlling UEP [76]. Fig. 14 gives a simple example of
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Fig. 13. PEBS crossing and controlling UEP
Fig. 14. System trajectory in the rotor angle space
the system trajectory in the rotor angle space [74].
PEBS method assumes that the system critical energy value is equal to the system
potential energy maximum value along the system trajectory. We can see from Fig. 13
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and Fig. 14 that when the system is not very ill-conditioned, the controlling UEP, and
the PEBS crossing points of fault-on and critical trajectories are very close. Therefore,
PEBS method can get an accurate approximation of critical clearing time (CCT). The
advantage of PEBS method is that it does not need the Controlling UEP calculation,
which is very complex and time consuming. The system post-fault trajectory path is
not known before the CCT solution. It may give either an optimistic or pessimistic
estimate of the CCT. Iterative PEBS [74] and Corrective PEBS [77] are proposed to
give more accurate solution of CCT. Their proedures are going as follows:
Step 1. Integrate the fault-on trajectory, use the fault-on µ and post-fault admttance
matrix Y to get the ¯rst PEBS crossing point µcross, that is, at time T ,
[f(µ)]T ² (µ ¡ µs) changes the sign from '-' to '+', and VPE gets its local
maximum which is the ¯rst estimate of Vcr.
Step 2. Use the fault-on µ, ~! and Y to ¯nd the transient energy V equal to VPE.
That time point Tu is the estimate of the CCT.
Step 3. Integrate the post-fault trajectory from Tu to T .
Step 4. If [f(µ)]T ² (µ ¡ µs) doesn't change the sign, that Tu is the CCT, stop. Else,
¯nd the new VPE and µcross, go to Step 2 to ¯nd new Tu, say it is Tu2. If
jTu2 ¡ Tuj · ", stop, either Tu or Tu2 is the CCT. Else, let Tu = Tu2, go to
Step 3.
From this iterative or corrective PEBS method, we can get the more accurate
results of the CCT.
For the transient energy margin, we can use µcross as the approximate µu, and
then use Eq. 4.14 to get the energy margin. If we do not use PEBS method, we
can use other Lyapunov-like methods, i.e., the MOD method [67, 74], to get the real
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Controlling UEP and ¯nally get the energy margin. But it may be much slower than
PEBS method because the grouping pattern of the machines at instability is fairly
complex and also arriving at the Controlling UEP may be very di±cult.
C. Transient Stability Control Classi¯cation
There are many fast stability control means in the literature and real practice
[18, 19, 53, 93{101]. From the generator side, we have the generator tripping, fast
valving, dynamic braking, etc. From the load side, we have the load reduction (by
voltage reduction), load shedding, etc. From the network side, we have FACTS
controllers (TCSC, SVC, etc.), shunt reactors and capacitors, switching on/o® lines,
etc. For all the above control means, there are two comprehensive ways: either change
the Pm (fast valving), or change the admittance matrix Y . The generator tripping is
the combination of the two. Therefore, we can de¯ne two stability control categories,
generator-input-based control (GIBC) means, and admittance-based control (ABC)
means.
For generator-input-based control (GIBC) means, the variance of Pm can be eas-
ily obtained. For admittance-based control (ABC) means, the variances of admittance
matrix Y can be obtained as follows:
For a g-generator-l-bus system, the augmented admittance matrix:
Y^ =
264Ygg Ygl
Ylg Yll
375 (4.18)
where
Yll = Ybus + Ygen + Yload,
Ybus: load °ow node admittance matrix,
Ygen: generator node admittance matrix, at generator-connected bus, admittance
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of generator branch; others, 0
Yload: load node admittance matrix, at load bus, constant admittance of load;
others, 0
Yll: l £ l bus admittance matrix
Ygg: g £ g generator admittance matrix
Ylg: l £ g bus-generator admittance matrix
Ygl: g £ l generator-bus admittance matrix
The reduced admittance matrix is:
Y = Ygg ¡ Ygl(Yll)¡1Ylg (4.19)
For all the single admittance-based control (excluding generator tripping), from
fast decoupled power °ow method [59], we know that:
Yll;new = Yll ¡ b ¤MT ¤M (4.20)
(Yll;new)
¡1 = (Yll)¡1 ¡ c ¤X ¤M ¤ (Yll)¡1 (4.21)
where
c = (¡1=b+M ¤X)¡1,
X = (Yll)
¡1 ¤MT .
Therefore, we get the reduced admittance matrix variance for each control means,
4Y = Ynew ¡ Yold = Ygl[(Yll)¡1 ¡ Yll;new)¡1]Ylg = Ygl[cXM(Yll)¡1]Ylg (4.22)
There are di®erent network control means to change the reduced admittance
matrix as follows:
(1). One line i¡ j outage or switching o®
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M : row vector which is null except for Mi = a and Mj = ¡1
a: o®-nominal turns ratio referred to the bus corresponding to column i, for a
transformer; 1, for a line
b: line or nominal transformer series admittance
(2). One line i¡ j switching on
M : row vector which is null except for Mi = ¡a and Mj = 1
a, b are the same as above.
(3). Inserting TCSC at line i¡ j, compensation ratio k, 0 < k < 1
M : row vector which is null except for Mi = a and Mj = ¡a,
a =
p
1=k ¡ 1,
b is the same as above.
(4). Switching on shunt reactor, capacitor, braking-resistor, SVC at bus i
M : row vector which is null except for Mi = 1
b: admittance of shunt reactor, capacitor, braking-resistor, SVC
(5). Switching o® shunt reactor, capacitor, braking-resistor, SVC, load reduction at
bus i
M : row vector which is null except for Mi = ¡1
b: admittance of shunt reactor, capacitor, braking-resistor, SVC,
for load reduction or shedding, b = k, 0 ¸ k · 1.
They are represented in Table V.
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Table V. Admittance based conrol (ABC) means and associated parameters
ABC Control
Means
Mi Mj b
Line Outage a: Transformer:o®-nominal ratio;
Line:1
-1 Line or nominal transformer series ad-
mittance
Line On ¡a 1 Same as above
TCSC Insertion a =
p
1=k ¡ 1, k: compensation capac-
ity, 0 < k < 1
¡a Same as above
Shunt reactor, ca-
pacitor, or braking-
resistor On
1 N/A Admittance of shunt reactor, capacitor
or resistor
Shunt reactor,
capacitor, braking-
resistor O®
-1 N/A Same as above
Load Reduction or
Shedding
-1 N/A Admittance of reduced load
D. Sensitivity Analysis of Transient Energy Margin
For the transient energy margin, its sensitivity to a change in any parameter
®k(µ
cl; µu; ~!cl; P pfi ; B
pf
ij ; G
pf
ij ), can be given by the partial derivative of 4V with re-
spective to ®k.
4V =
mX
k=1
@4V
@4®k4®k (4.23)
For our control means, since the clearing time is known, we only consider the
changes of µu, P
pf
i , B
pf
ij , G
pf
ij . We can get the change of energy margin by
4V =
nX
i=1
@4V
@Pmi
4Pmi +
nX
i=1
@4V
@Gii
4Gii+
n¡1X
i=1
nX
j=i+1
@4V
@Gij
4Gij +
n¡1X
i=1
nX
j=i+1
@4V
@Bij
4Bij +
nX
i=1
@4V
@µui
4µui
(4.24)
where,
@4V
@Pmi
= ¡(µui ¡ µci l) (4.25)
@4V
@Gii
= E2i (µ
u
i ¡ µci l) (4.26)
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@4V
@Gpfij
= ¯ijEiEj(sin µ
u
ij ¡ sin µcijl) (4.27)
@4V
@Bpfij
= ¡EiEj(cos µuij ¡ cos µcijl) (4.28)
@4V
@µui
= ¡P pfi +
nX
j=i+1
(EiEjB
pf
ij sin µ
u
i + ¯ijEiEjG
pf
ij cos µ
u
i ) (4.29)
4Gij and 4Bij are real and imaginary parts of 4Yij obtained from Eq. 4.22.
For big parameter change (i.e., additional network topology change), Controlling
UEP may change. From [69] we get
(A)(4µui ) = Ri (4.30)
where
Aii = (1¡ 2Mi
MT
)
nX
j=1;j 6=i
Cij cos µ
u
ij (4.31)
Aij = (2
Mj
MT
)
nX
l=1;l 6=j
Dlj sin µ
u
lj + Cij cos µ
u
ij ¡Dij sin µuij (4.32)
Ri =E
2
i4Gii ¡
Mi
MT
nX
j=1
E2j4Gjj ¡
Mi
MT
nX
l=1
nX
j=1;j 6=l
ElEj cos µlj4Glj+
nX
j=1;j 6=i
(EiEj sin µ
u
ij4Bij + EiEj cos µuij4Gij)
(4.33)
Therefore, we can get
4µu = A¡1R (4.34)
µui;new = µ
u
i +4µui (4.35)
if max(4µu) < ", we can assume Controlling UEP does not change and ignore
the 5th item of Eq. 4.24.
74
E. Transient Stability Control Scheme
After a big disturbance (fault) and its clearing, ¯rst we do the transient stability
study (i.e., use PEBS method) to see if the system is stable or not. If yes, keep
monitoring the system. If not, check all available control means being considered
or not. If all control means have not been analyzed, use the sensitivity analysis of
transient energy margin to ¯nd the suitable control to make the system stable, then
check the solution in the time-domain transient stability program to make sure it will
work. Finally, issue the control command to stabilize the system and keep monitoring
the system. If all control means are analyzed and the system is still unstable, warning
will be given and the process will stop. In general, as the last defense, load shedding
and islanding may be deployed to try to keep the loss as minimal as possible to make
the system stable. Fig. 15 is the °owchart of the transient stability control scheme.
F. Case Study
Given a modi¯ed IEEE 14-bus system (modi¯ed load and generation conditions),
assume the following control means are available: all generators have fast valving
(decrease up to 20% capacity), braking resistors (up to 50% capacity), line switching,
TCSC (up to 50% compensation capacity of that line), SVC (up to 50MVA capacity),
all buses have shunt reactors and capacitors (up to 50MVA capacity), load shedding.
Simply use the classical machine model as described in Eq. 4.2 and 4.3 for the step-
by-step (SBS) time-domain method and PEBS method. Fig. 16 gives the modi¯ed
IEEE-14 bus system con¯guration. The system parameters are given in Appendix A.
Assume that at t = 0s, a three-phase-to-ground-fault occurs at 95% of line 9¡14.
The critical clearing time (CCT) of step-by-step (SBS) method is 0.06s, and the CCT
of PEBS method is 0.09s. There is a small di®erence between the SBS and PEBS
75
Start
System Monitoring
Any big
disturbance?
(i.e, fault)
Transient Stability Analysis
Stable?
Update network topology,
generation/load patterns
Sensitivity
Analysis
Find Optimal
Control
N
N
Y
Y
All control means
considered?
Warning
and Exit
N
Y
Fig. 15. Flowchart of the transient stability control scheme
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Fig. 16. Modi¯ed IEEE 14-bus system
methods due to numerical reason. When the fault is cleared at t = 0:1s, we get the
machine rotor angle curve given in Fig. 17, where generator G1's angle goes upward
and all other generators' angles go downward. The transient energy margin is -0.042
by PEBS method, as described in Eq. 4.14.
All rotor angles in Fig. 17 to 20 are in degrees. Total simulation time is 3s. The
maximal angle di®erence is chosen as the angle stability criterion. If the maximal
angle di®erence among all machines is bigger than 900 at t = 3s, the system is
unstable. Otherwise, the system is stable.
Assume stability control can be activated at t=0.11s with the aid of the sensitivity
analysis. Four kinds of stability control means are chosen: line switching, TCSC
switching, load shedding, shunt capacitor and reactor switching.
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Fig. 17. Machine angles when clearing fault at t=0.1s
Table VI. New transient energy margin after line switching
Line switching L4(B1-2) L12(B7-9) L2(B4-7) L3(B4-9) L1(B5-6)
Energy margin -0.007 -0.025 -0.027 -0.028 -0.033
Case 1. Line switching
We get the new transient energy margin after switching additional single line as
given in Table VI.
We only list the top 5 lines, which contribute positively for stabilizing the sys-
tem. Besides these 5 lines, the switching of line L5(B2-3), L14(B6-11), L20(B13-14)
also contributes positively to stability. Switching line L11(B7-8) will result in island-
ing. The switching of other lines contributes negatively to stability. The sensitivity
analysis is not very accurate because of the ¯rst order approximation. Thus, we need
to check with the time-domain transient stability program. Take the example of line
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Fig. 18. Machine angles when switching line L4(B1-2) at t=0.11s
L4(B1-2) switching, which contributes the most to stability, as described in Fig. 18.
We can see the energy margin after this switching is -0.007. That means the system
is still unstable after this control. However, by the angle di®erence criterion in the
time-domain transient stability program, the system can be judged as stable.
Case 2. TCSC switching
Similarly, we get the top 5 lines by TCSC switching with compensation capacity
of 50%, as described in Table VII.
If we check with the time-domain transient stability program, the system is still
unstable.
Case 3. Load shedding
79
Table VII. New transient energy margin after TCSC switching
Line switching L1(B5-6) L2(B4-7) L3(B4-9) L7(B1-5) L9(B3-4)
Energy margin -0.017 -0.034 -0.034 -0.037 -0.037
Fig. 19. Machine angles when 5.5% load shedding at t=0.11s
Assume the constant impedance model and the area load can be shed simulta-
neously with the same ratio. From the analytical sensitivity of the transient energy
margin, we can get that the 24.5% load shedding is needed for the energy margin
changing from negative to positive value. In fact, by the transient stability program,
only 5.5% load shedding can make the system stable. Fig. 19 is the rotor angle curve
obtained by shedding 5.5% load. Fig. 20 is the rotor angle curve obtained by shedding
24.5% load.
Case 4. Shunt capacitor and reactor switching
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Fig. 20. Machine angles when 24.5% load shedding at t=0.11s
In general, when switching on shunt capacitor or reactor at the same bus, their
contributions for the energy margin are opposite. For this modi¯ed IEEE 14-bus
system, when switching on shunt capacitors with 50 MVA capacity at buses 1, 2, 3
and 14 respectively, the energy margin will increase. While doing it at other buses,
the energy margin will decrease. When switching on shunt reactors at these buses,
their contributions are opposite. When switching on shunt reactor with 50 MVA
capacity at buses 4 to 13 respectively, the energy margin will increase. For switching
shunt capacitor and reactor at buses by 50 MVA capacity, the most contributing shunt
capacitor switching is at bus 1, and the new transient energy margin is -0.038; the
most contributing shunt reactor switching is at bus 9, and the new transient energy
margin is -0.036. If we check with the time-domain transient stability program, both
cases are sill unstable.
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G. Summary
This chapter presents a transient stability control scheme based on the potential
energy boundary surface (PEBS) method and analytical sensitivity of the transient
energy margin. If the system is judged unstable after the disturbance, it calculates
the new transient energy margin by analyzing the contribution of each control means.
Suitable control to stabilize the system will be found to stabilize the system. The
time-domain transient stability program is used as a reference. Two categories of the
stability control means are given: admittance-based control (ABC) and generator-
input-based control (GIBC). A modi¯ed IEEE 14-bus system is used to test the
methodology. Some simulation results are provided. It needs to be considered that
the PEBS method has limits, i.e., the assumption that the PEBS crossing point and
Controlling UEP are close to each other for normal system. For some special cases,
the error of this method may be a bit bigger. For example, if we ¯nd a solution
by sensitivity analysis, the system may be stable after this control. However, in the
time-domain transient stability program, it may still be unstable. On the other hand,
the system may be judged unstable by sensitivity analysis after the control action.
But it may be stable by the time-domain transient stability program. The accuracy
of the ¯rst order sensitivity analysis may be in°uenced by a big parameter change,
which results in the change of Controlling UEP. We can also see from the results that
the sensitivity analysis method can give good direction for the control but the ¯nal
contribution needs to be veri¯ed using the time-domain transient stability program.
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CHAPTER V
INTERACTIVE SCHEME TO DETECT, PREVENT AND MITIGATE THE
CASCADING OUTAGES¤
A. Introduction
As mentioned in Chapter II, there is an interaction between the system-wide
and local levels of power system, especially the interaction between system security
and local relay action. The relay misoperation or unwanted operation is either the
trigger factor or accelerating factor for the large area cascading outages [1, 23]. The
research on the interaction between power system security and protective relay is not
as strong as the research on security and protection individually [47,49,51,102{105].
In this chapter, an interactive scheme between system-wide and local monotoring
and control based on the previouse research results in [52, 106] is developed and
explained in details to help detect, prevent and mitigate the cascading outages. The
backgorund of interaction between system-wide and local levels is given in Section
B. The system-wide monitoring and control is discussed in Section C, followed by
the simple description of the local monitoring and control tool in Section D. The
interactive scheme is explained in Section E. Case Study and Summary are given in
Section F and G respectively.
¤Part of the material in this chapter is reprinted with permission from \New moni-
toring and control scheme for preventing cascading outage" by Nan Zhang, Hongbiao
Song and Mladen Kezunovic, Presented in 2005 Proceedings of the 37th Annual North
American Power Symposium, Ames, Iowa, Oct. 2005, pp. 37-42. c°2005 IEEE.
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B. Background of Interaction between System-wide and Local Levels
Traditional system transient stability analysis assumes the protection system
can clear the fault within expected time. It does not take into account the relay
misoperation or unwanted operation. From the local side, the relay settings are
based on fault analysis results under prevailing worst case system operating conditions
and consider time and protection zone coordination. When fault occurs within their
protection zone, most relays use local information and act independently as fast as
possible without considering the system information. The relay settings based on
o®-line studies that may not meet the requirements of the dynamic changing system
conditions. The relay behavior impact the system transient stability performance.
From the historical record, 75% of the US major power system disturbances is related
to protection problems [23]. There are two kinds of relay misoperation: 1) fail to clear
the fault or clear the fault in a delayed time, 2) trip the healthy element while the
fault is at another element, or operate undesirably at the non-fault conditions, such
as power swing and overload/low voltage conditions. More work needs to be done
on interaction between the system transient stability and relay behavior. In recent
years, wide area monitoring and control system (WAMS) [32{38] using synchronized
phasor measurement (PMU) tries to ful¯ll this gap. It is still in its early development
stage.
1. Static Analysis of Relay Behavior
Relay behavior needs to be monitored carefully from the system side. The
competitive market operation causes steady state changing conditions, where change
of the generation pattern and change of the transfer between generator and load
are frequent. This results in frequent changes of power °ow patterns through the
84
Fig. 21. Sammis-Star 345-kV line trip
transmission network and signi¯cant changes of the bus voltages and line currents.
During the normal operation condition, the behavior is still within the system security
limit and there is no problem with the protective relay. However, after some outages,
the system operating security has been degraded. Some transmission lines may have
overload conditions and their connected buses may have low voltage problems. The
apparent impedance seen by distance relays may fall into their backup protection
zones. They may trip the healthy lines if the lasting time is longer than the setting
time period and may further trigger the cascading outage. As described in Chapter II,
the tripping of the Sammis-Star 345KV line during the August 14, 2003 Northeastern
blackout is one of these examples [1].
Voltages and currents obtained from the power °ow method or state estimation or
phasor measurements are used to calculate the apparent impedance seen by distance
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relay, similar as vulnerability index calculation in Chapter III for line distance relay:
zd;ij =
Vi
Iij
=
Vi
(Vi ¡ Vj)=zij (5.1)
¹zd;ij =
zd;ij
zij
=
Vi
Vi ¡ Vj =
jVij
jVi ¡ Vjj
6 µd;ij = dij 6 µd;ij (5.2)
Dij = dij ¡Kzj sin(¼=2¡ ®ij + µd;ij)j (5.3)
where,
Vi,Vj: voltage of buses i an j,
Iij: line current from bus i to bus j,
zij: impedance of line i¡ j,
zd;ij: apparent impedance seen by distance relay from bus i to bus j of line i¡ j,
¹zd;ij: normalized apparent impedance seen by distance relay from bus i to bus j,
dij,µd;ij: magnitude and angle of normalized apparent impedance ¹zd;ij,
®ij: line i¡ j impedance angle,
Kz: zone setting,
Dij: de¯ned as the distance from the apparent impedance seen by transmission
line distance relay to the relay protection zone circle, zero or negative values mean
the apparent impedance is at or within the protection zone circle.
For the static line distance relay (with mho characteristic), it will operate if
jzd;ij ¡ ½j · j½j (5.4)
where,
½ = ¯zij=2 (5.5)
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Normalize as
j¹zd;ij ¡ ¯=2j · ¯=2 (5.6)
For typical relay settings, for zone 1, choose ¯ = 0:8; for zone 2, choose ¯ = 1:2.
Zone 3 relay settings are power system dependent, here we can simply choose 2.4 or
choose settings to protect the full length of next longest neighboring line.
During the system normal operation or dynamic changing conditions, normalized
apparent impedance and distance relay margin can be calculated for the monitoring
of distance relay performance. If the apparent impedance is close to relay protection
zone, warning information will be given and careful monitoring of the associated
distance relay is required.
2. Dynamic Analysis of Relay Behavior
Dynamic apparent impedance can be calculated from the retrieved dynamic
voltage phasors from time-domain transient stability analysis [47, 102]. They can be
used for approximate dynamic analysis of relay behavior.
Let us use the two-axis generator model (assumption: x
0
d = x
0
q), constant impedance
load model, and IEEE type I voltage regulator [75]. The system dynamics can be
represented by:
T
0
q0
_E
0
di = ¡E
0
di + (xqi ¡ x
0
qi)Iqi (5.7)
T
0
d0
_E
0
qi = ¡E
0
qi + (xdi ¡ x
0
di)Idi + Efdi (5.8)
_±i = !0(!i ¡ 1) (5.9)
2Hi _!i = ¡(E 0diIdi + E
0
qiIqi)¡Di(!i ¡ 1) + Pmi (5.10)
TFi _Rfi = ¡Rfi + KFi
TFi
Efdi (5.11)
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TEi _Efdi = ¡(KEi + SEi)Efdi + VRi (5.12)
TAi _VRi = KAi(Rfi ¡ KFi
TFi
Efdi ¡ 1
KAi
VRi ¡ Vti + Vref;i (5.13)
where,
Vti: phase voltage at the generator bus, Vti =
q
V 2di + V
2
qi,
Vdi: d-axis voltage, Vdi = x
0
qiIqi + E
0
di,
Vqi: q-axis voltage, Vqi = x
0
diIdi + E
0
qi,
The algebraic equations for an m-machine-n-bus network are described by:264Ig
Il
375 =
264Ygg Ygl
Ylg Yll
375
264Vg
Vl
375 (5.14)
Ig = (Idi + jIqi)e
j(±i¡¼=2) (5.15)
Vg = (E
0
di + jE
0
qi)e
j(±i¡¼=2) (5.16)
We can get the time domain Vg, Ig phasors easily, and the Y matrix will change
due to the pre-fault, during-fault and post-fault periods.
If we use the classical generator model (one-axis) and constant impedance load
model, as described by Eq. 4.2 and 4.3 in Chapter IV, it is more simple. After we
get the ± from swing equations, generator voltage phasor is Vg;i = Eie
j±i since Ei is
constant.
By assuming constant impedance load model, that is, Il = 0, we can get bus
voltage phasors:
Vl = ¡(Yll)¡1YlgVg (5.17)
After the dynamic voltage phasors are obtained from the time-domain simulation,
the apparent impedance zd;ij, normalized apparent impedance ¹zd;ij, relay margin Dij,
and the conclusion of whether apparent impedance falling into protction zone can be
obtained from Eq. 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.6.
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By this method, we can check whether the dynamic apparent impedance falls
into the distance relay protection zones or not. For example, it may appear that
the system is stable because fault clearing time is smaller than critical clearing time
(CCT) from the transient stability viewpoint. However, distance relay may "see"
apparent impedance falling into its protection zone so it may trip the line. Cascading
outage may occur if there is no e®ective means to prevent relay misoperation.
C. System-wide Monitoring and Control
The system-wide monitoring and control tool is intended for installation at the
control center. It consists of security analysis and security control. Security analy-
sis includes routine and event-based security analyses for expected and unexpected
events. Security control includes emergency control means obtained from the steady
state control scheme discussed in Chapter III and transient stability control scheme
discussed in Chapter IV for those expected and unexpected events.
Routine security analysis includes vulnerability analysis, static contingency anal-
ysis and dynamic contingency analysis. Vulnerability analysis of operating condition
of the whole system and individual element is performed by the topology processing
method and operation index (vulnerability index, margin index, sti®ness index, dis-
tance relay margin index, etc.) method. Vulnerable elements can be identi¯ed and
their associated relays need to be closely monitored. System security information
will be de¯ned. Static contingency analysis uses the fast approximate network contri-
bution factor (NCF) method and full AC power °ow method to do the contingency
analysis and ¯nds vulnerable contingencies. Dynamic contingency analysis studies
the transient stability performance of the contingency. The static analysis of relay
behavior will be included in the static contingency analysis. The dynamic analysis
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of relay behavior will be obtained during the the dynamic contingency analysis. For
the routine static and dynamic contingency analysis, contingencies which can lead to
an overload condition, voltage problem, angle stability, voltage stability, etc., will be
found and taken care of. Either preventive control actions need to be taken to prevent
such problems or emergency control needs to be activated if such contingencies have
already happened.
Event-based security analysis is triggered when a disturbance occurs. If it is
studied by the routine security analysis, its results are made available. If it is not
studied by the routine security analysis, the transient stability analysis and steady
state analysis will be taken. If the disturbance drives the system into emergency state
or more vulnerable conditions, associated emergency control means will be found and
activated to keep the system secure.
Security control handles both the expected vulnerable contingencies obtained
from the routine security analysis and the unexpected real-time events. It uses the
steady state control scheme and transient stability control scheme to ¯nd control
means to solve the steady state line overload and bus low/high voltage problems and
transient stability problem.
The block diagram of detailed system-wide monitoring and control and simple
relationship with local tool and system-wide tool is shown in Fig. 22.
D. Local Monitoring and Control
Exact local information is very useful for the system analysis and control. For
example, when the transmission lines are tripped during the abnormal conditions, the
system operators at the control center may not know whether there is a fault or not.
If there is a fault, they may not know the exact fault location, which is important for
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Fig. 22. Block diagram of system monitoring and control
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operators' situational awareness and correct action to keep the system secure. When
the system tool ¯nds vulnerable elements in the system based on extensive simulation
and analysis, it will be a great help if there are local monitoring and control tools
installed at those locations to enhance the security. On one side, the local tool
can provide exact disturbance information and analysis results to the control center
when needed. On the other side, the system tool can send monitoring and control
commands to the local tools based on wide-area measurement and system analysis.
Such a local monitoring and control tool is proposed in [107]. The neural network
based fault detection and classi¯cation (NNFDC), synchronized sampling based fault
location (SSFL), and event tree analysis (ETA) can be combined into an advanced
real time fault analysis tool and relay monitoring system. This will provide detailed
information about disturbance and relay operations for each related local substation.
The proposed local montoring and control tool [107] is described in Fig. 23. It can
be installed locally at substations.
Neural network based fault detection and classi¯cation (NNFDC) provides a
more accurate fault detection and classi¯cation by using the same data inputs as
distance relay. Synchronized sampling based fault location (SSFL) provides a very
high accuracy in fault location using data from two ends of the line. Event tree
analysis (ETA) provides an e±cient way for real time observation of relay operations
and an e®ective local disturbance diagnostic support.
The system tool can work together with any kind of local tools to help detect,
prevent and mitigate cascading outages.
92
Advanced Real-time Fault
Analysis
NNFDC
SSFL
Distance Relay system
Event Tree Analysis
Local Analysis Result of
Disturbance
S
y
s
te
m
 M
o
n
ito
rin
g
 a
n
d
 C
o
n
tro
l
Local Corrective
Control
System Security
Control
Monitoring
command
Security
Alert
Disturbance
Analysis report
R
e
la
y
 O
p
e
ra
tio
n
s
M
e
a
s
u
re
m
e
n
ts
Fig. 23. Block diagram of local monitoring and control
E. Interactive Scheme
The steps of an interactive scheme of system-wide and local monitoring and
control can be described as follows:
Step 1. Routine security analysis performed by the system tool at the control center:
(a) decides security level and ¯nds vulnerable elements, then sends system
security status and monitoring command to the local tool at substations; (b)
identi¯es critical contingencies, and starts associated control schemes to ¯nd
the control means for those expected events.
Step 2. Local monitoring performed by the local tool at substations: (a) starts anal-
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Fig. 24. Block diagram of interactive scheme
ysis when disturbance occurs; (b) if it ¯nds relay misoperation, it makes
correction or receives system control command for better control; (c) reports
disturbance information and analysis results to the system tool.
Step 3. Event-based security analysis performed by the system tool at the control
center: (a) if it ¯nds a match with expected event, activates the emergency
control if the disturbance is harmful; (b) if it does not ¯nd a match, analyzes
if the system is secure or not; (c) if the system is not secure, it ¯nds new
emergency control and activates it.
Step 4. Update information and go to Step 1.
The block diagram of the interactive scheme is represented by Fig. 24.
The potential infrastructure of the interactive scheme is described in Fig. 25.
The interactive scheme between the system-wide and local monitoring and con-
trol introduces bene¯ts that individual tool can not achieve separately. System tool
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has wide-area information and better view of the system security and vulnerability
conditions. It can have a better control decision and notify local substation tool to
carefully monitor vulnerable elements during abnormal conditions. Local tool has
exact real-time local disturbance information. It has the ability to detect, classify
and locate the fault with high accuracy and provide good reference for judging the
relay operation. It can also predict some possible events from the local side. Both
of the system and local tools work together to ful¯ll the major task: to help detect,
prevent and mitigate cascading outages.
F. Case Study
The IEEE 39-bus New England test system, as shown in Fig. 26, is used to
demonstrate this new approach. Data source can be found in [73]. Detailed system
data can be found in Appendix C. The transformer branches are taken as transmission
lines in those studies.
Case 1. Routine system security analysis
In this case, the system routine security analysis is implemented o®-line and the
vulnerable lines in the system are found. For those lines, the proposed local analysis
tool needs to be installed to monitor protective relays.
From topology processing, we ¯nd 11 single-connection lines from the one-line
diagram shown in Fig. 26: L22(B19-16), L47(B20-19), and 9 generator branches L37-
L45 which connect G30-G38 respectively. There will be one or several buses isolated
from the system if any of the above 11 lines are disconnected. The local analysis tools
need to be applied on those lines.
From vulnerability analysis for distance relays (we assume all lines have distance
relays), we ¯nd the top 6 most vulnerable lines according to their vulnerable indices
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Fig. 26. IEEE 39-bus New England test system
Table VIII. Vulnerable lines and their neighboring lines
Line No Bus Connection VI Relay Neighboring Lines (contingencies on those
lines could in°uence the vulnerable line)
L37 B6-31 0.0240 L9(B6-5),L11(B7-6),L12(B11-6)
L38 B10-32 0.0206 L16(B11-10),L17(B13-10)
L42 B23-36 0.0191 L28(B23-22),L29(B24-23)
L45 B29-38 0.0157 L33(B29-26),L34(B29-28)
L43 B25-37 0.0149 L4(B25-2),L30(B26-25),L33(B29-26)
L29 B24-23 0.0131 L24(B24-16),L28(B23-22),L42(B23-36)
as shown in Table VIII. For those lines, the fault on the neighboring lines may a®ect
their relay operations. Therefore, those lines also need to be monitored using the
local analysis tools.
97
Case 2. Event-based security analysis
In this case, it will be demonstrated how relay misoperation can cause system
casading outages. Then we describe how to prevent such situation with the bene¯t
of the proposed interactive analysis approach.
The sequence of the scenarios is as follows:
1) t=0s, a 3-phase fault occurs at middle of line L27(B22-21).
2) The fault is cleared at t=0.11s by tripping L27.
3) t=1s, a second 3-phase fault occurs at middle of line L3(B3-2).
4) The second fault is cleared at t=1.11s by tripping L3.
5) End simulation at t=4.0s.
This contingency may cause distance relay at B24 of L29 (B24-B23) to misoperate
at power swing and line overload condition. The trajectory of apparent impedance
seen by that relay is shown in Fig. 27. After the ¯rst fault is cleared, the apparent
impedance seen by the distance relay enters its zone 3 circle at t=0.242s and stays
inside till t=1.008s. After the second fault is cleared, the apparent impedance enters
zone 3 circle again at t=1.520s. It may stay at the zone 3 circle longer than the time
setting. The distance relay may trip L29 if zone 3 timer expires.
If the distance relay at B24 trips L29 wrongly, buses 22, 23, 35 and 36 will be
isolated from the system, including the G35, G36 and load at B23, B24. The rest of
the system is unbalanced and cascading outage may happen.
This situation can be prevented by the interactive scheme. From Table VIII,
we can see that L29 has already been placed on the vulnerable line list and the local
analysis tool needs to be installed on that line. When the ¯rst fault occurs, the
event-based system security analysis is activated. Through power °ow analysis, it is
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Fig. 27. Apparent impedance seen by distance relay at L29 during simulation
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determined that L29 is heavily loaded due to L27 outage. Also from the topology
processing, it is determined that L29 and L27 are double-line connections. Loss of L27
and L29 will disconnect buses B22, 23, 35 and 36 from the major system. Therefore,
through the system analysis, an alert signal will be sent to the local analysis tool at
L29 to increase the security level. When the second fault happens, the local analysis
tool draws a conclusion to block the relay from tripping at above mentioned condition.
That information will be sent back to the system to initiate appropriate control to
mitigate the disturbance and increase system security level.
In reality, it is impossible that one or two contingencies like the ones discussed
above can cause large system oscillations and heavy overload condition in bulk power
system. Usually there is enough time for proper control actions to mitigate the
disturbances and prevent them from unfolding. The proposed interactive scheme
between system-wide and local monitoring and control can help detect, prevent and
mitigate possible cascading outages.
G. Summary
This chapter presents an interactive scheme between system and local monitoring
and control tools. Following conclusions can be drawn from the case studies:
² New approach to help detect, prevent and mitigate cascading outages can be
obtained by coordinating the system-wide and local monitoring and control
tools.
² The system-wide monitoring and control tool can ¯nd the vulnerable elements
and send monitoring command to the local tool for detailed monitoring.
² Emergency control means for expected events can be identi¯ed by the routine
security analysis and activated when such events occur.
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² Emergency control means for unexpected events can be identi¯ed by event-
based security analysis and activated to mitigate the disturbance and help keep
the system secure.
² The local monitoring and control tool can ¯nd the exact disturbance information
and make a correction if there is relay misoperation. Further information can
be sent to the system tool for better security control.
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CHAPTER VI
EVALUATION OF STEADY STATE CONTROL SCHEME, TRANSIENT
STABILITY CONTROL SCHEME AND INTERACTIVE SCHEME
A. Introduction
Steady state control scheme, transient stability control scheme and interactive
scheme have been described in Chapters III, IV and V respectively. Steady state
control scheme has the ability to solve steady state problems such as line overload and
bus high/low voltage, evaluate the system vulnerability and security information by
vulnerability index and margin index during the system normal operation and slow
dynamic changing conditions, identify the vulnerable parts in the system, predict
some possible successive events and ¯nd suitable prevntive control to help keep the
power system secure if taken properly. It can help prevent the possible cascading
outages at its ¯rst slow steady state stage. Transient stability control scheme focus
on tansient stabilty analysis and control. If the system is judged unstable after
the disturbances, stability control means based on potential energy boundry surface
(PEBS) method and analytical sensitivity of transient energy margin will be found,
veri¯ed by time-domain simation method, and activated to keep the system stable. It
can also help prevent or mitigate the possible cascading outages. Interactive scheme
considers the interaction between system-wide and local levels, takes the advanages of
both system and local information and uses some techniques from steady state control
scheme and transient stability control scheme to help detect, prevent and mitigate
the cascading outages.
Those three schemes can work separately and jointly. For example, steady state
control scheme works during the normal operation and slow steady state changing
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conditions after an outage of an element or for the purpose of better economics and
more secure operation. Transient stability control scheme studies the system dynam-
ics within a short time period immediately after the disturances. Security concern is
the ¯rst priority. Interactive scheme works during both the steady state and dynamic
conditions. It monitors the system all the time and takes action when needed.
Lots of case studies have been performed using IEEE 24-bus, 14-bus and 39-bus
systems in Chapters III, IV and V respectively. In this Chapter, case studies will be
implemented in IEEE 118-bus system for those three schemes. Other references can
be found for data sources from [108{110] and modi¯ed for future research purpose.
Detailed system data is attached in Appendix D. Studies of steady state control
scheme, transient stability control scheme and interactive scheme will be provided in
Sections B, C and D respectively. Summary will be given in Section E.
B. Study of Steady State Control Scheme
The IEEE 118-bus system con¯guration is given in Fig. 28.
This is a 118-bus-186-branch system. The power base is 100MVA. System con-
¯guration, base power °ow data and machine data can be found in [108{110]. 20
generators and 3 areas are given in Fig. 28. Generator at Bus 112 is taken as
G20. There are 5 generators at Area 1: G1(B10), G2(B12),G3(B25), G4(B26) and
G5(B31). There are 8 generators at Area 2: G6(B45), G7(B49),G8(B54), G9(B59),
G10(B61), G11(B65), G12(B66) and G13(B69). And there are 7 generators at Area 3:
G14(B80), G15(B87),G16(B89), G17(B100), G18(B103), G19(B111) and G20(B112).
G13(B69) is the slack bus. There are 4 tie-lines between Area 1 and Area 2: L30(B23-
24), L44(B15-33), L45(B19-34), and L54(B30-38). There are 5 tie-lines between
Area 2 and Area 3: L114(B70-74), L115(B70-75), L116(B69-75), L119(B69-77), and
103
Fig. 28. IEEE 118-bus system
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Table IX. Transmission lines and their thermal limits (in MVA value)
Line L7(B8-9) L8(B8-5) L9(B9-10) L31(B23-25) L32(B26-25) L33(B25-27)
Limit 640 510 650 380 380 280
Line L36(B30-17) L37(B8-30) L38(B26-30) L51(B38-37) L104(B65-68) L107(B68-69)
Limit 520 500 380 350 480 500
Line 108(B69-70) 116(B69-75) 119(B69-77) 126(B68-81) 127(B81-80) 183(B68-116)
Limit 300 280 580 560 560 300
L126(B68-81). There are power transfers from Area 1 to Area 2 and from Area 2 to
Area 3. The power °ow data has been modi¯ed from the base case to stress the sys-
tem conditions as follows: a) to increase real power outputs of generators at Areas 1
and 2, 1.2 times the base case was used, b) to reduce real power outputs of generators
at Area 3, 0.6 times the base case was used, and c) to increase load at Area 3, 1.1
times the base case was used.
To make sure there is no line overload for any N-1 contingency analysis, most
line thermal limits are set as 250MVA except for those lines in Table IX.
Case 1. N-1 contingency analysis
Take Area 2 as the study area with tie-lines between Area 2 and Area 3 included.
Vulnerability index (VI) and margin index (MI) are calculated by network contribu-
tion factor (NCF) method and AC power °ow (PF) method. Top 6 single line outage
contingencies out of 73 contingenies ranked by NCF and PF are given in Table X.
From Table X, we can see that the fast network contribution factor (NCF)
method gives similar results as AC power °ow method in vulnerability index and
margin index. The NCF method can be used as fast contingency screening method
to select top ranking contingencies and then use the AC power °ow method for detail
analysis.
The associated vulnerability index values by NCF and PF methods, and margin
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Table X. Top 6 line outages ranked by vulnerability index and margin index
Vulnerability Index Margin Index
NCF PF NCF PF
L104(B65-68) L126(B68-81) L104(B65-68) L126(B68-81)
L126(B68-81) L51(B38-37) L126(B68-81) L104(B65-68)
L119(B69-77) L50(B34-37) L119(B69-77) L51(B38-37)
L116(B69-75) L116(B69-75) L51(B38-37) L119(B69-77)
L51(B38-37) L114(B70-74) L60(B34-43) L94(B63-64)
L111(B24-72) L119(B69-77) L71(B49-51) L71(B49-51)
Table XI. Top 6 line outages ranked by vulnerability index based on NCF method
(Part I: Total VI, VI at bus and generator parts)
LineNo Total VI VI V VI loadab VI Pg VI Qg
L104 40.1764 6.2572 5.2130 3.6456 5.3205
L126 34.7011 6.3026 4.9668 3.6456 5.4195
L119 32.8457 6.2557 4.8922 3.6456 5.3165
L116 32.2414 6.2722 5.0858 3.6456 5.7821
L51 31.9812 6.2557 5.0538 3.6456 5.3165
L111 31.6911 6.2609 5.1260 3.6456 5.3168
index values by NCF and PF methods are given in Table XI to Table XVI respectively.
The larger the Vulnerability Index values, the more vulnerable the system con-
ditions.
Table XII. Top 6 line outages ranked by vulnerability index based on NCF method
(Part II: VI at branch part)
LineNo VI Pl VI Ql VI Qc VI angl VI Relay VI line o®
L104 12.9921 0.9656 0.0227 2.3687 2.3910 1
L126 9.2021 0.9603 0.0204 1.5628 1.6211 1
L119 8.4579 0.9366 0.0254 1.1193 1.1965 1
L116 7.3236 0.9135 0.0251 1.0597 1.1339 1
L51 7.3722 0.8942 0.0254 1.1713 1.2465 1
L111 7.2800 0.9378 0.0254 1.0089 1.0899 1
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Table XIII. Top 6 line outages ranked by vulnerability index based on PF method
(Part I: Total VI, VI at bus and generator parts)
LineNo Total VI VI V VI loadab VI Pg VI Qg
L126 53.4040 6.5208 4.9733 3.8250 24.7608
L51 48.6295 6.4806 5.0594 3.6898 21.3417
L50 40.3328 6.1543 4.9092 3.6485 14.6112
L116 39.8147 6.3581 5.0902 3.6558 13.4622
L114 37.8500 6.2738 5.0067 3.6483 11.8905
L119 36.7172 6.2477 4.8587 3.6461 10.9213
Table XIV. Top 6 line outages ranked by vulnerability index based on PF method
(Part II: VI at branch part)
LineNo VI Pl VI Ql VI Qc VI angl VI Relay VI line o®
L126 8.3997 0.8045 0.0123 1.5227 1.5850 1
L51 7.7818 0.6169 0.0219 1.2833 1.3542 1
L50 7.3176 0.5834 0.0253 1.0003 1.0830 1
L116 7.4240 0.5894 0.0225 1.0687 1.1439 1
L114 7.3276 0.5989 0.0249 0.9992 1.0801 1
L119 7.3447 0.6008 0.0253 0.9957 1.0770 1
Table XV. Top 6 line outages ranked by margin index based on NCF method
LineNo Total MI MI V MI loadab MI Pg MI Qg MI Sf MI angl
L104 4.5620 0.7476 0.8126 0.5622 0.8371 0.7040 0.8985
L126 4.6096 0.7462 0.8129 0.5622 0.8334 0.7435 0.9114
L119 4.6377 0.7476 0.8130 0.5622 0.8392 0.7580 0.9178
L51 4.6420 0.7476 0.8123 0.5622 0.8392 0.7641 0.9166
L60 4.6483 0.7458 0.8124 0.5622 0.8393 0.7669 0.9218
L71 4.6490 0.7469 0.8128 0.5622 0.8393 0.7666 0.9211
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Table XVI. Top 6 line outages ranked by margin index based on PF method
LineNo Total MI MI V MI loadab MI Pg MI Qg MI Sf MI angl
L126 4.5882 0.7425 0.8129 0.5493 0.8097 0.7594 0.9144
L104 4.6126 0.7485 0.8126 0.5573 0.8283 0.7537 0.9122
L51 4.6241 0.7431 0.8123 0.5588 0.8329 0.7631 0.9139
L119 4.6373 0.7461 0.8130 0.5617 0.8332 0.7642 0.9190
L94 4.6376 0.7452 0.8130 0.5615 0.8222 0.7745 0.9211
L71 4.6385 0.7329 0.8128 0.5619 0.8391 0.7711 0.9206
The smaller the margin index values, the less secure the system conditions. Mar-
gin index method does not gives the same contingency rankings as vulnerability index
method because they do not model the same parameters.
Case 2. Successive study after the most vulnerable contingency
From Table X, we know that L104(B65-68) outage is identi¯ed as the most
vulnerable contingency by network contribution factor (NCF) method both in vul-
nerability index and margin index values, because it increases the loading conditions
of other transmission lines by NCF approximation. We can see the largest line real
power vulnerability index (VI Pl) value is 12.9921. The AC power °ow method iden-
ti¯es L126 (B68-81) outage as the most vulnerable contingency because it has the
largest generator reactive power output vulnerability index (VI Qg) value as 24.7608.
We can further study the vulnerability index and margin index values after line L104
or L126 outage.
From Table XVII and Table XVIII, we can see that the results of network contri-
bution factor (NCF) method for contingency analysis and vulnerability and security
evaluation are very similar to AC power °ow method. Thus, NCF method can be
used for a fast screening method for security analysis.
Case 3. Steady state control after double-line outage
Suppose that tie-line L116 (B69-75) has a permanent fault and is tripped by pro-
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Table XVII. Top 6 line outages ranked by vulnerability index and margin index after
L104(B65-68) is out-of-service
Vulnerability Index Margin Index
NCF PF NCF PF
L106(B49-69) L107(B68-69) L126(B68-81) L107(B68-69)
L119(B69-77) L126(B68-81) L106(B49-69) L126(B68-81)
L126(B68-81) L51(B38-37) L119(B69-77) L51(B38-37)
L105(B47-69) L116(B69-75) L105(B47-69) L96(B38-65)
L107(B68-69) L119(B69-77) L51(B38-37) L119(B69-77)
L51(B38-37) L50(B34-37) L107(B68-69) L94(B63-64)
Table XVIII. Top 6 line outages ranked by vulnerability index and margin index after
L126(B68-81) is out-of-service
Vulnerability Index Margin Index
NCF PF NCF PF
L119(B69-77) L116(B69-75) L119(B69-77) L104(B65-68)
L104(B65-68) L114(B70-74) L104(B65-68) L51(B38-37)
L116(B69-75) L51(B38-37) L107(B68-69) L116(B69-75)
L115(B70-75) L50(B34-37) L51(B38-37) L94(B63-64)
L51(B38-37) L47(B35-37) L116(B69-75) L71(B49-51)
L114(B70-74) L104(B65-68) L71(B49-51) L96(B38-65)
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Table XIX. Line °ow before and after L116(B69-75) and L119(B69-77) outage (in p.u.)
LineNo Apparent °ow before outage Apparent °ow after outage Flow after outage Line limit
L126(B68-81) 3.7897 6.5442 6.5005+j0.7545 5.6000
L127(B81-80) 3.7778 6.4618 6.4617-j0.0308 5.6000
Table XX. Generator contribution factors for L126(B68-81) and L127(B81-80)
G11 G12 G13 Others
A Gen(126,:) 0.5206 0.1288 0.4282 0
A Gen(127,:) 0.5175 0.1280 0.4256 0
tective relay. Assume another tie-line L119(B69-77) is also tripped by protective relay
because of relay misoperation which is a possible case. This is a double-line outage
contingency. We only consider the steady state condition in this case study. After
this contingency, two lines have overload conditions: L126(B68-81) and L127(B81-80)
as shown in Table XIX.
If there are no e®ective overload relieving method, the overloaded L126 and L127
will be tripped successively. Then tie-lines L114 (B70-74) and L115 (B70-75) will also
be tripped because of the overload conditions. Cascading outage may occur.
Assume that there are no other transmission network control means and load
control means. Only generator control means is available. L126 (B68-81) is the tie-
line between Area 2 and Area 3. The power is transmitted ¯rst through L126 and
then through L127(B81-80) from Area 2 to Area 3 besides the other two tie-lines L114
and L115. The generator contribution factor for L126 and L27 is given in Table XX.
G11 and G13 are two generators which contribute most to L126 and L127 over-
load. G14 (B80) is one least contributing generator and the closest generator to L126
and L127. The steady state control scheme picks up two generator pairs to relieve
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Table XXI. Generator contribution factors for L126(B68-81) and L127(B81-80) after
adjustment
G11 G12 G13 Others
A Gen(126,:) 0.4867 0.1202 0.4119 0
A Gen(127,:) 0.4842 0.1195 0.4097 0
the overoad, to decrease G11 (B65) and increase G4 (B80) to relieve L126 overload,
to decrease G13 (B69) and increase G14 (B80) to relieve L127 overload,
Step 1. The amount of real power at L126 that needs to be reduced is 6:5005¡ 5:6 =
0:9005 p.u.. For G11, the reduced amount is 0:5206=(0:5206 + 0:4282) ¤
0:9005 = 0:4941 p.u. For G13, the reduced amount is 0:9005¡0:4941 = 0:4064
p.u. The increased amount of G14 is 0.9005 p.u.
Step 2. After the generator real power outputs adjustment, AC power °ow is run.
New line °ow at L126 is 5:7347 + j0:6336 p.u. and new line °ow at L127
is 5:7048 + j0:1175 p.u. The apparent powers are 5.7696 p.u. and 5.7060
p.u. respectively, still larger than the thermal limit 5.6 p.u. The generator
contribution factor for L126 and L27 is given in Table XXI.
The amount of real power at L126 that needs to be reduced is 5:7347 ¡
5:6 = 0:1347 p.u. For G11, the reduced amount is 0:4867=(0:4867+ 0:4119) ¤
0:1347 = 0:073 p.u. For G13, the reduced amount is 0:1347¡ 0:073 = 0:0617
p.u. The increased amount of G14 is 0.1347 p.u.
Step 3. After the new generator real power outputs adjustment, AC power °ow is
run. New line °ow at L126 is 5:6204+ j0:6173 p.u. and new line °ow at L127
is 5:5916+ j0:1382 p.u. The apparent powers are 5.6542 p.u. and 5.5933 p.u.
respctively. L127 overload is solved. L126 overload is remaining but much
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Table XXII. Solution methods for L126(B68-81) and L127(B81-80) overload
Procedure Result
Base condition L126 & L127 overload (6.5442 p.u. & 6.4618
p.u. vs. their 5.6 p.u. limit)
Outage of L126 & 127, cascading outage and
system islanding may occur
Step 1 Down G11 with 0.4941 p.u., down G13 with
0.4064 p.u., and Up G14 with 0.9005 p.u.;
L126 and L127 overload relieved but not
solved
Step 2 Down G11 with 0.073 p.u., down G13 with
0.0617 p.u., and Up G14 with 0.1347 p.u.;
L126 overload relieved but not solved, L127
overload solved
Step 3 Down G11 with 0.0542 p.u., and Up G14 with
0.0542 p.u.;
L126 overload solved
Step 4 Veri¯ed with AC load °ow Solve, no violation.
smaller than the original case. G11 is still the most contributing gnerator.
Thus G11 and G14 pair is choosen. 0.0542 p.u. is the amount for G11 to
decrease and for G14 to increase.
Step 4. New AC power °ow is run. New line °ow at L126 is 5:5734 + j0:6108 p.u.
and new line °ow at L127 is 5:5451 + j0:1466 p.u. The apparent power are
5.6 p.u. and 5.547 p.u. respectively. Overload problem is solved.
The above procedure can be summarized in Table XXII.
From this study case, we can see that steady state control scheme is very e®ective
in preventing possible cascading outages.
C. Study of Transient Stability Control Scheme
Assume there is a 3-phase fault at 50% of line L119(B69-77) at t = 0s, the
critical clearing time (CCT) for this fault is 0:147s within a 3s simulation period.
The stability criteria in time domain simulation is maximum phase angle di®erence
of 1800 between two machines. If the angle di®erence between any two machines after
the simulation is larger than 1800, the system is unstable. Otherwise, the system is
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Fig. 29. Machine angles with fault clearing time at t=0.149s
stable. If the fault is cleared at t = 0:149s, the power system loses stability at
t = 0:799s in time domain simulation. The transient energy margin is ¡0:8997 from
the potential energy boundary surface (PEBS) method. We can see the unstable
swing in Fig. 29.
Assume the stability control means can be activitated at t = 0:25s. We can use
the method from the transient stability control scheme. From Chapter IV, we know
that the transient stability control means can be classi¯ed in two groups: generator-
input-based control (GIBC) and admittance-based control (ABC). Following case
studies are those two kinds of control.
Case 1. Transient stability control by generator-input-based control (GIBC)
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Table XXIII. Sensitivity analysis and fast-valving for stability control
GenNo @E=@Pm Pm0 (p.u.) 4Pm (p.u.) ratio
1 -2.9863 5.4000 0.3013 0.0558
2 -3.0353 1.0200 0.2964 0.2906
3 -2.9748 2.6400 0.3024 0.1146
4 -2.9937 3.7680 0.3005 0.0798
5 -2.9215 0.0840 0.3079 3.6660
6 -3.0028 0.2280 0.2996 1.3141
7 -2.9714 2.4480 0.3028 0.1237
8 -3.0092 0.5760 0.2990 0.5190
9 -2.9829 1.8600 0.3016 0.1622
10 -3.0162 1.9200 0.2983 0.1554
11 -2.9217 4.6920 0.3079 0.0656
12 -2.9639 4.7040 0.3035 0.0645
13 -2.7592 7.9879 0.3261 0.0408
14 -2.6624 2.8620 0.3379 0.1181
15 -1.7415 0.0240 0.5166 21.5254
16 -2.1993 3.6420 0.4091 0.1123
17 -2.3161 1.5120 0.3884 0.2569
18 -2.2980 0.2400 0.3915 1.6312
19 -2.1241 0.2160 0.4235 1.9609
20 -2.1354 0.0001 0.4213 7021.8
Generator fast-valving is an e®ective generator-input-based control (GIBC). It
uses mechanism of rapid opening and closing steam valves to reduce the generator
accelerting power after the disturbance [53]. We can get the generator input (me-
chanical power Pm) part of analytical sensitivity of energy margin from Eq. 4.25 in
Chapter IV. Table XXIII gives the Pm part of senitivity of energy margin, variance
of Pm to make the energy margin positive and the fast-valving ratio compared with
machine original mechanical power Pm.
From Table XXIII we can see that to stabilize the system, generator fast-valving
amount from 0.2964 p.u. (G2) to 0.5166 p.u. (G15) of di®erent generators is needed.
In addition, fast-valving of G5, G6, G15, G18, G19 and G20 are impossible because
they need the reduced amount larger than their original mechanical power input.
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Fig. 30. Machine angles with G13 fast-valving at t=0.25s
If we check the varying ratio compared with original mechanical power input Pm,
G13(B69) and G1(B10) are two least varying generators with ratios of 4.08% and
5.58% respectively. G13 is the nearest generator to the disturbance in electrical
distance thus the most disturbed and accelerating one. Therefore, G13 is the optimal
one chosen for stability control. G1 is also a good choice because of the small fast-
valving ratio.
Let us use G13 fast-valving with 4.08% (0.3261 p.u.) at t = 0:25s. From the
time-domain simulation analysis, it can be seen that it stabilizes the system. We can
see this from Fig. 30.
Let us use G1 fast-valving with 5.58% (0.3013 p.u.) at t = 0:25s. From the
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Fig. 31. Machine angles with G1 fast-valving at t=0.25s
time-domain simulation analysis, it can be seen that it stabilizes the system. We can
see this from Fig. 31.
Case 2. Transient stability control by admittance-based control (ABC)
Generator dynamic braking, shunt reactor switching, shunt capacitor switching,
line switching, TCSC inserting, SVC inserting, etc. are all admittance-based con-
trols (ABC) because they change the system admittance parameters. Here we only
consider the generator dynamic braking, shunt reactor switching and shunt capacitor
switching at B69 to stabilize G13 because it is the most accelerating one. Assume we
have such kinds of control means at B69. For certain amount of generator dynamic
braking, shunt reactor switching and shunt capacitor switching, we can calculate the
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Table XXIV. Stability control means at B69 and their contribution to transient energy
margin
Control Means Amount(MVA) Energy Margin Amount(MVA) Energy Margin
Braking resistor 30 -0.024 31 0.006
Shunt capacitor 100 -0.025 104 0.011
Shunt reactor 100 -1.707 10 -0.9833
admittance matrix variance by Eq. 4.22 and then get the transient energy margin
variance by Eq. 4.24. By adjusting the varing amout of generator braking resistor,
shunt reactor or shunt capacitor, we can make the new energy margin positive. Then
we verify the result in the time-domain simulation analysis. If it can stabilize the sys-
tem, we can use this control. If it can not, we continue adjusting the control amount
to stabilize the system.
Table XXIV is a summary table of control means and their contribution to tran-
sient energy margin based on potential energy boundary surface (PEBS) method and
sensitivity analysis.
Shunt reactor switching contributes negative to the transient energy margin.
We verify the results of dynamic braking with 31MVA capacity and shunt capacitor
switching with 104MVA capacity at B69 in time-domain simulation and ¯nd they can
stabilize the system, as we can see from Fig. 32 and Fig. 33.
D. Study of Interactive Scheme
Interaction between system-wide and local levels needs to be considered to assure
the secure operation of the power system. A simple example is given to show the
advantage of this iteractive scheme. From the system point of view, tie-lines are
important lines because they transfer power among di®erent sub-systems or areas
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Fig. 32. Machine angles with dynamic braking at G13 at t=0.25s
to ful¯ll the imprtant transaction. Assume there is a 3-phase fault at 50% of line
L119(B69-77) at t = 0s, the critical clearing time (CCT) for this fault is 0:147s within
a 3s simulation period. This fault is cleared at t = 0:05s. We consider for the next
cotingency. The vulnerability analysis by AC power °ow method after this line outage
ranks L107 (B68-69) outage as the most vulnerable case both in total vulnerability
index value and relay vulnerability index value. Then we assume another 3-phase
fault occurs at t = 1s. The critical clearing time (CCT) for this fault is 0.0117s. We
clear this fault at t = 1:0117s. The senario goes as follows:
1) t = 0s, ¯rst 3-phase fault occurs at 50% at L119 (B69-77);
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Fig. 33. Machine angles with shunt capacitor switching at B69 at t=0.25s
2) t = 0:05s, the fault is cleared by tripping breakers at two ends of L119 and no
breaker re-closing;
3) t = 1:0s, second 3-phase fault occurs at 50% at L107 (B68-69);
4) t = 1:0117s, the fault is cleared by tripping breakers at two ends of L106 and no
breaker re-closing;
5) t = 3s, stop the time-domain simulation.
The time-domain simulation ¯nds that distance relay at B69 of L108 (B69-70)
sees apparent impedance falling into its zone 3 from t = 1:365s to 2:024s with the
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Fig. 34. Normalized apparent impedance seen by distance relay at B69 of L108
lasting time as long as 0.659s. Distance relay at B69 of L116(B69-75) sees apparent
impedance falling into its zone 3 from t = 1:277s to t = 2:177s with the lasting time
as long as 0.9s. We can see this from Fig. 34 and Fig. 35.
For distance relay settings, zone 1 and zone 2 are chosen to be 0.8 and 1.2
respectively. Zone 3 is used to protect the 120% of the next longest neighboring line.
If any of those two relays misoperates, the system will lose stability and cascading
outages will occur. If such an interactive scheme is installed in the system, the system
tool can identify the vulnerable condition after L119 outage. Thus it can notify local
tools to monitor distance relays at L108 and L116 carefully. After the next fault
occurs at L107, the local tool can conclude that there are no faults at L108 and L116
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Fig. 35. Normalized apparent impedance seen by distance relay at B69 of L116
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during the power swing condition so that it can block the possible misoperations
of those two relays. Thus the possible cascading outages may be prevented by this
interactive scheme.
E. Summary
This chapter describes the relationship among steady state control scheme, tran-
sient stability control scheme and interactive scheme and evaluates their performace
by case studies implemented in the IEEE 118-bus system. Promising simulation
results show that those control schemes can help detect, prevent and mitigate the
cascading outages.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSIONS
A. Summary of Achievements
The purpose of this dissertation is to understand the mechanism of power sys-
tem cascading outages and develop some e®ective methods and tools to help detect,
prevent and mitigate them. Catastrophic power system cascading outages worldwide
in recent years urge power system researchers and engineers to try their best to un-
derstand cascading outages and ¯nd ways to detect, prevent and mitigate them. The
research in this area is far from being mature. This disseration presents three e®ective
schemes: steady state control scheme, transient stability control scheme and interac-
tive scheme to help detect, prevent and mitigate power system cascading outages.
Steady state control scheme can help detect and prevent a possible cascading
outage at its ¯rst slow evolving steady state stage. New tools such as vulnerability
index (VI), margin index (MI), network contribution factor (NCF) method, topology
processing method and selected minimum load shedding (SMLS), and new controls
such as transmission network control based on NCF method, generator control based
on generator distribution factor (GDF) and load control based on load distribution
factor (LDF) to solve the overload or congestion have been proposed and developed.
Transient stability control scheme can help prevent and mitigate the possible cascad-
ing outage at its transient progress stage. It uses a Lypunov direct method, potential
energy boundary surface (PEBS) method, and analytical sensitivity of transient en-
ergy margin for fast stabilizing control. Its results are veri¯ed by the accurate time-
domain transient stabilty analysis method. Interactive scheme takes advantages of
accurate system and local information and analysis results, uses some techniques from
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both steady state conrol and transient stability control and works all the time at the
system-wide level and local level. Detailed system-wide monitoring and control tool
has been developed. Lots of simulation studies have been tested in the IEEE 14-bus,
24-bus, 39-bus and 118-bus systems and the promising results show their ability to
help detect, prevent and mitigate cascading outages.
In Chapter II, the fundamentals of the proposed approach have been presented.
The mechanism of cascading outages are studied. The proposed solutions based on
the assumed mechanism are introduced. Chapter III has provided the steady state
control scheme for early detection and prevention of cascading outages. With the aid
of new tools and new controls, the whole new procedure has been proposed as fol-
lows: evaluation of the system operating condition, identi¯cation of vulnerable parts
and conditions, predicition of possible successive events, and prevention of cascading
outages with appropriate control. The transient stability control scheme has been in-
troduced in Chapter IV. It aims at solving the transient stability problem and ¯nding
e®ective transient stability control means to stabilize the system. New classi¯cation
of transient stability control means has been given: generator-input-based control
(GIBC) and admittance-based control (ABC). For each control means available in
the system, its contribution to transient stability has been calculated based on the
sensitivity analysis of transient energy margin and parameter variance. Such con-
trol means can make the transient energy margin to move from negative to positive,
which allows the system to go from unstable to stable state. This will be veri¯ed
in the more accurate time-domain transient stability analysis. If it is true, based
on the time-domain simulation, an optimal transient stability control will be found
and activated. If it is not true, adjustment of the control amount will be made and
¯nal solution will be found. Chapter V has developed an interactive scheme between
system-wide and local monotoring and control to help detect, prevent and mitigate
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cascading outages. The interaction between system-wide and local levels, especially
the system transient stability analysis and relay action, has been studied. E®ective
tools in the system-wide monitoring and control, such as routine security analysis in-
cluding vulnerability analysis, static and dynamic contingency analysis for expected
events, event-based security analysis for unexpected real-time events, security control
based on steady state control and transient stability control for expected events and
unexpected events, have been implemented. An interactive scheme between system-
wide and local levels has been described. Evaluation of those three schemes has been
studied in the IEEE 118-bus system and reported in Chapter VI. The simulation
results in this chapter show the ability of those three schemes to help detect, prevent
and mitigate the cascading outages.
B. Research Contribution
The contributions of this dissertation are both the theoretical research and prac-
tical applications in detection, prevention and mitigation of power system cascading
outages. The conventional research and operating practice in this area are not su±-
cient to ful¯ll this task. This dissertation has studied the causes and mechanism of
cascading outages and developed three e®ective schemes: steady state control scheme,
transient stability control scheme, and interactive scheme to help detect, prevent and
mitigate the cascading outages. New tools and new techniques have been imple-
mented. They can also serve as operator training tool and decision support tool for
better system situational awareness and better system security analysis and control.
The proposed approach can be added into the current EMS functionality at control
center or serve as an additional security control tool. The bene¯ts from using those
schemes have been demonstrated clearly in the dissertation.
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C. Suggestions for Future Research
The research and study in this dissertation may be continued. Extensive transient
stability analysis and control should be continued because fast approximate potential
energy boundary surface (PEBS) method is not as accurate as time-domain simulation
method. Voltage stability analysis can also be included because several large area
cascading outages are related to voltage collapse issue. All software modules are
programmed in Matlab and they can be implemented in Visual C++ or Java for
faster speed and better user interface.
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APPENDIX A
IEEE 14-BUS TEST SYSTEM DATA
There are ¯ve tables for this test system data: Bus data, PV bus data, Line data,
Generator data, Exciter data. People can ¯nd some data sources from [110,111] and
modify them for their own research purpose.
Follows are some descriptions for data meaning.
Bus Type: 1: PQ bus; 2: PV bus; 3: Swing bus.
PL, QL: real and reactive parts of the load at buses, in MVA value.
Bs: shunt capacitor at buses, in MVA value.
Vm: bus voltage magnitudes, in p.u. value. PQ bus voltage magnitudes will be
set as 0 for power °ow °at start.
Area: cntrol area.
Pg: real power output of generators, in MVA value.
Qg: reactive power ouput of PV buses, in MVA value. Some PV buses are not
generators.
Qmax: Maximum reactive power ouput of PV buses, in MVA value.
Qmin: Minimum reactive power ouput of PV buses, in MVA value.
Vsp: Scheduled PV bus voltage magnitudes, in p.u. value.
Pmax: Maximum real power ouput of generators, in MVA value.
fBus: from bus, the begining bus of the line.
tBus: to bus, the ending bus of the line.
r: line resistance, in p.u. value.
x: line reactance, in p.u. value.
b: line charging capacitance, in p.u. value.
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limit: transmission line limits, in MVA value.
tap-ratio: Non-nominal transformer ratios. 1 for lines and nominal transformers.
angle: phase-shifter angles.
H: generator inertial constant, in value of s at its own MVA rating.
D: damping, in value of s at its own MVA rating.
Xd: d-axis synchronous reactance, in value of p.u. at its own MVA rating.
X
0
d: d-axis transient reactance, in value of p.u. at its own MVA rating.
Xq: q-axis synchronous reactance, in value of p.u. at its own MVA rating.
X
0
q: q-axis transient reactance, in value of p.u. at its own MVA rating.
¿
0
d0: d-axis open circuit transient time constant, in value of s.
¿
0
q0: q-axis open circuit transient time constant, in value of s.
KA: regulator gain.
KE: exciter constant related to self-excited ¯eld.
KF : regulator stabilizing circuit gain.
¿A: regulator ampli¯er time constant.
¿E: exciter time constant.
¿F : regulator stabilizing cirucuit time constant.
KSe: saturation parameter.
¿Se: saturation parameter.
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Table XXV. Bus data of IEEE 14-bus system
BusNo Type PL(MVA) QL(MVA) Bs(MVA) Vm Area
1 3 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.060 1
2 2 21.70 12.70 0.00 1.045 1
3 2 94.20 19.00 0.00 1.010 1
4 1 47.80 -3.90 0.00 1.018 1
5 1 7.60 1.60 0.00 1.020 1
6 2 11.20 7.50 0.00 1.070 1
7 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.062 1
8 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.090 1
9 1 39.50 16.60 19.00 1.056 1
10 1 9.00 5.80 0.00 1.051 1
11 1 3.50 1.80 0.00 1.057 1
12 1 6.10 1.60 0.00 1.055 1
13 1 13.50 5.80 0.00 1.050 1
14 1 14.90 5.00 0.00 1.035 1
Table XXVI. PV bus data of IEEE 14-bus system
BusNo Pg(MVA) Qg(MVA) Qmax(MVA) Qmin(MVA) Vsp(p.u.) Pmax(MVA)
1 232.39 -16.89 300.00 -300.00 1.060 332.39
2 40.00 42.40 50.00 -40.00 1.045 140.00
3 20.00 23.39 40.00 0.00 1.010 100.00
6 18.00 12.24 24.00 -6.00 1.070 100.00
8 15.00 17.36 24.00 -6.00 1.090 100.00
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Table XXVII. Line data of IEEE 14-bus system
LineNo fBus tBus r(p.u.) x(p.u.) b(p.u.) limit(MVA) tap-ratio angle
1 5 6 0.00000 0.25202 0.00000 250 0.930 0.000
2 4 7 0.00000 0.20912 0.00000 250 0.970 0.000
3 4 9 0.00000 0.55618 0.00000 250 0.960 0.000
4 1 2 0.01938 0.05917 0.05280 250 1.000 0.000
5 2 3 0.04699 0.19797 0.04380 250 1.000 0.000
6 2 4 0.05811 0.17632 0.03740 250 1.000 0.000
7 1 5 0.05403 0.22304 0.04920 250 1.000 0.000
8 2 5 0.05695 0.17388 0.03400 250 1.000 0.000
9 3 4 0.06701 0.17103 0.03460 250 1.000 0.000
10 4 5 0.01335 0.04211 0.01280 250 1.000 0.000
11 7 8 0.00000 0.17615 0.00000 250 1.000 0.000
12 7 9 0.00000 0.11001 0.00000 250 1.000 0.000
13 9 10 0.03181 0.08450 0.00000 250 1.000 0.000
14 6 11 0.09498 0.19890 0.00000 250 1.000 0.000
15 6 12 0.12291 0.25581 0.00000 250 1.000 0.000
16 6 13 0.06615 0.13027 0.00000 250 1.000 0.000
17 9 14 0.12711 0.27038 0.00000 250 1.000 0.000
18 10 11 0.08205 0.19207 0.00000 250 1.000 0.000
19 12 13 0.22092 0.19988 0.00000 250 1.000 0.000
20 13 14 0.17093 0.34802 0.00000 250 1.000 0.000
Table XXVIII. Generator data of IEEE 14-bus system
GenNo BusNo MVA H(s) D(s) Xd(p.u.) X
0
d(p.u.) Xq(p.u.) X
0
q(p.u.) ¿
0
d0(s) ¿
0
q0(s)
1 1 615 5.148 0.00 0.8979 0.2995 0.646 0.646 7.40 0.00
2 2 60 6.540 0.00 1.0500 0.1850 0.980 0.360 6.10 0.30
3 3 60 6.540 0.00 1.0500 0.1850 0.980 0.360 6.10 0.30
4 6 25 5.060 0.00 1.2500 0.2320 1.220 0.715 4.75 1.50
5 8 25 5.060 0.00 1.2500 0.2320 1.220 0.715 4.75 1.50
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Table XXIX. Exciter data of IEEE 14-bus system
GenNo BusNo KA KE KF ¿A(s) ¿E(s) ¿F (s) KSe ¿Se(s)
1 1 200 1.00 0.0012 0.0250 0.000 1.00 0.0039 1.555
2 2 20 1.00 0.0010 0.0250 0.314 1.00 0.0039 1.555
3 3 20 1.00 0.0010 0.0250 0.314 1.00 0.0039 1.555
4 6 20 1.00 0.0010 0.0250 0.314 1.00 0.0039 1.555
5 8 20 1.00 0.0010 0.0250 0.314 1.00 0.0039 1.555
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APPENDIX B
IEEE 24-BUS TEST SYSTEM DATA
There are ¯ve tables for this test system data: Bus data, PV bus data, Line data,
Generator data, Exciter data. Data desriptions are the same as those in Appendix
A. Data source can be found at [66]. The generators at the same bus have been
combined into one generator. The generator data and exciter data have been changed
accordingly into p.u. value at the system 100MVA base.
Table XXX. Bus data of IEEE 24-bus system
BusNo Type PL(MVA) QL(MVA) Bs(MVA) Vm Area
1 2 108.00 22.00 0.00 1.035 1
2 2 97.00 20.00 0.00 1.035 1
3 1 180.00 37.00 0.00 0.977 1
4 1 74.00 15.00 0.00 1.040 1
5 1 71.00 14.00 0.00 0.975 1
6 1 136.00 28.00 -100 0.950 1
7 2 125.00 25.00 0.00 1.025 1
8 1 171.00 35.00 0.00 1.009 1
9 1 175.00 36.00 19.00 1.000 1
10 1 195.00 40.00 0.00 1.007 1
11 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.000 1
12 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.020 1
13 3 265.00 54.00 0.00 1.020 1
14 2 194.00 39.00 0.00 0.980 1
15 2 317.00 64.00 0.00 1.014 1
16 2 100.00 20.00 0.00 1.017 1
17 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.055 1
18 2 333.00 68.00 0.00 1.050 1
19 1 181.00 37.00 0.00 1.000 1
20 1 128.00 26.00 0.00 1.056 1
21 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.050 1
22 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.050 1
23 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.050 1
24 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.025 1
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Table XXXI. PV bus data of IEEE 24-bus system
BusNo Pg(MVA) Qg(MVA) Qmax(MVA) Qmin(MVA) Vsp(p.u.) Pmax(MVA)
1 172.00 28.20 80.00 -50.00 1.035 192.00
2 172.00 14.00 80.00 -50.00 1.035 192.00
7 240.00 51.60 180.00 0.00 1.025 300.00
13 285.30 122.10 240.00 0.00 1.020 591.00
14 0.00 13.70 200.00 -50.00 0.980 200.00
15 215.00 0.05 110.00 -50.00 1.014 215.00
16 155.00 25.22 180.00 -50.00 1.017 155.00
18 400.00 137.40 200.00 -50.00 1.050 400.00
21 400.00 108.20 200.00 -50.00 1.050 400.00
22 300.00 -29.76 96.00 -60.00 1.050 300.00
23 660.00 135.36 310.00 -125.00 1.050 600.00
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Table XXXII. Line data of IEEE 24-bus system
LineNo fBus tBus r(p.u.) x(p.u.) b(p.u.) limit(MVA) tap-ratio angle
1 1 2 0.003 0.014 0.461 175 0.930 0.000
2 1 3 0.055 0.211 0.057 175 0.970 0.000
3 1 5 0.022 0.085 0.023 175 0.960 0.000
4 2 4 0.033 0.127 0.034 175 1.000 0.000
5 2 6 0.050 0.192 0.052 175 1.000 0.000
6 3 9 0.031 0.119 0.032 175 1.000 0.000
7 3 24 0.002 0.084 0.000 400 1.015 0.000
8 4 9 0.027 0.104 0.028 175 1.000 0.000
9 5 10 0.023 0.088 0.024 175 1.000 0.000
10 6 10 0.014 0.061 2.459 175 1.000 0.000
11 7 8 0.016 0.061 0.017 175 1.000 0.000
12 8 9 0.043 0.165 0.045 175 1.000 0.000
13 8 10 0.043 0.165 0.045 175 1.000 0.000
14 9 11 0.002 0.084 0.000 400 1.030 0.000
15 9 12 0.002 0.084 0.000 400 1.030 0.000
16 10 11 0.002 0.084 0.000 400 1.015 0.000
17 10 12 0.002 0.084 0.000 400 1.015 0.000
18 11 13 0.006 0.048 0.100 500 1.000 0.000
19 11 14 0.005 0.042 0.088 500 1.000 0.000
20 12 13 0.006 0.048 0.100 500 1.000 0.000
21 12 23 0.012 0.097 0.203 500 1.000 0.000
22 13 23 0.011 0.087 0.182 500 1.000 0.000
23 14 16 0.005 0.059 0.082 500 1.000 0.000
24 15 16 0.002 0.017 0.036 500 1.000 0.000
25 15 21 0.006 0.049 0.103 500 1.000 0.000
26 15 21 0.006 0.049 0.103 500 1.000 0.000
27 15 24 0.007 0.052 0.109 500 1.000 0.000
28 16 17 0.003 0.026 0.055 500 1.000 0.000
29 16 19 0.003 0.023 0.049 500 1.000 0.000
30 17 18 0.002 0.014 0.030 500 1.000 0.000
31 17 22 0.014 0.105 0.221 500 1.000 0.000
32 18 21 0.003 0.026 0.055 500 1.000 0.000
33 18 21 0.003 0.026 0.055 500 1.000 0.000
34 19 20 0.005 0.040 0.083 500 1.030 0.000
35 19 20 0.005 0.040 0.083 500 1.030 0.000
36 20 23 0.003 0.022 0.046 500 1.015 0.000
37 20 23 0.003 0.022 0.046 500 1.015 0.000
38 21 22 0.009 0.068 0.142 500 1.000 0.000
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Table XXXIII. Generator data of IEEE 24-bus system
GenNo BusNo MVA H(s) D(s) Xd(p.u.) X
0
d(p.u.) Xq(p.u.) X
0
q(p.u.) ¿
0
d0(s) ¿
0
q0(s)
1 1 192 6.684 0.00 0.0298 0.0298 1.780 0.453 3.90 0.54
2 2 192 6.684 0.00 0.0298 0.0298 1.780 0.453 3.90 0.54
3 7 300 9.912 0.00 0.1259 0.1259 1.580 0.485 8.40 0.46
4 13 591 19.488 0.00 0.2475 0.2475 1.650 0.500 4.50 0.50
5 14 155 5.460 0.00 0.5460 0.5460 1.680 0.400 4.20 0.60
6 15 215 7.420 0.00 0.0090 0.0090 1.850 0.567 8.20 0.48
7 16 155 5.460 0.00 0.5460 0.5460 0.610 0.453 3.80 0.49
8 18 400 23.550 0.00 1.8840 1.8840 0.600 0.60 8.00 0.00
9 21 400 23.550 0.00 1.8840 1.8840 1.780 0.440 4.60 0.37
10 22 300 11.130 0.00 0.0247 0.0247 1.990 0.490 4.10 0.56
11 23 670 23.280 0.00 0.2236 0.2236 0.568 0.568 10.8 0.00
Table XXXIV. Exciter data of IEEE 24-bus system
GenNo BusNo KA KE KF ¿A(s) ¿E(s) ¿F (s) KSe ¿Se(s)
1 1 20.00 1.00 0.0010 0.0250 0.3140 1.00 0.0039 1.5550
2 2 20.00 1.00 0.0010 0.0250 0.3140 1.00 0.0039 1.5550
3 7 20.00 1.00 0.0010 0.0250 0.3140 1.00 0.0039 1.5550
4 13 20.00 1.00 0.0010 0.0250 0.3140 1.00 0.0039 1.5550
5 14 20.00 1.00 0.0010 0.0250 0.3140 1.00 0.0039 1.5550
6 15 20.00 1.00 0.0010 0.0250 0.3140 1.00 0.0039 1.5550
7 16 20.00 1.00 0.0010 0.0250 0.3140 1.00 0.0039 1.5550
8 18 20.00 1.00 0.0010 0.0250 0.3140 1.00 0.0039 1.5550
9 21 20.00 1.00 0.0010 0.0250 0.3140 1.00 0.0039 1.5550
10 22 20.00 1.00 0.0010 0.0250 0.3140 1.00 0.0039 1.5550
11 23 20.00 1.00 0.0010 0.0250 0.3140 1.00 0.0039 1.5550
150
APPENDIX C
IEEE 39-BUS TEST SYSTEM DATA
There are ¯ve tables for this test system data: Bus data, PV bus data, Line data,
Generator data, Exciter data. Data desriptions are the same as those in Appendix
A. Data source can be found at [73]. People can modify them for their own research
purpose.
Table XXXV. PV bus data of IEEE 39-bus system
BusNo Pg(MVA) Qg(MVA) Qmax(MVA) Qmin(MVA) Vsp(p.u.) Pmax(MVA)
30 250.00 144.92 99990 -99990 1.0475 350.00
31 572.83 207.04 99990 -99990 0.9820 1145.00
32 650.00 205.73 99990 -99990 0.9831 750.00
33 632.00 108.94 99990 -99990 0.9972 732.00
34 508.00 166.99 99990 -99990 1.0123 608.00
35 650.00 211.11 99990 -99990 1.0493 750.00
36 560.00 100.44 99990 -99990 1.0635 660.00
37 540.00 0.65 99990 -99990 1.0278 640.00
38 830.00 22.66 99990 -99990 1.0265 930.00
39 1000.00 87.88 99990 -99990 1.0300 1100.00
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Table XXXVI. Bus data of IEEE 39-bus system
BusNo Type PL(MVA) QL(MVA) Bs(MVA) Vm Area
1 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.047 1
2 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.049 1
3 1 322.00 2.40 0.00 1.030 1
4 1 500.00 184.00 0.00 1.003 1
5 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.005 1
6 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.007 1
7 1 233.80 84.00 0.00 0.996 1
8 1 522.00 176.00 0.00 0.995 1
9 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.028 1
10 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.017 1
11 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.012 1
12 1 8.50 88.00 0.00 1.000 1
13 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.014 1
14 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.011 1
15 1 320.00 153.00 0.00 1.015 1
16 1 329.00 32.30 0.00 1.032 1
17 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.034 1
18 1 158.00 30.00 0.00 1.031 1
19 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.050 1
20 1 680.00 103.00 0.00 0.991 1
21 1 274.00 115.00 0.00 1.032 1
22 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.050 1
23 1 247.50 84.60 0.00 1.045 1
24 1 308.60 -92.20 0.00 1.037 1
25 1 224.00 47.20 0.00 1.057 1
26 1 139.00 17.00 0.00 1.052 1
27 1 281.00 75.50 0.00 1.037 1
28 1 206.00 27.60 0.00 1.050 1
29 1 283.50 26.90 0.00 1.050 1
30 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.047 1
31 3 9.20 4.60 0.00 0.982 1
32 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.983 1
33 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.997 1
34 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.012 1
35 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.049 1
36 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.063 1
37 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.028 1
38 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.026 1
39 2 1104.00 250.00 0.00 1.030 1
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Table XXXVII. Line data of IEEE 39-bus system
LineNo fBus tBus r(p.u.) x(p.u.) b(p.u.) limit(MVA) tap-ratio angle
1 2 1 0.00350 0.04110 0.69870 1000 0.930 0.000
2 39 1 0.00100 0.02500 0.75000 1000 0.970 0.000
3 3 2 0.00130 0.01510 0.25720 1000 0.960 0.000
4 25 2 0.00700 0.00860 0.14600 1000 1.000 0.000
5 4 3 0.00130 0.02130 0.22140 1000 1.000 0.000
6 18 3 0.00110 0.01330 0.21380 1000 1.000 0.000
7 5 4 0.00080 0.01280 0.13420 1000 1.000 0.000
8 14 4 0.00080 0.01290 0.13820 1000 1.000 0.000
9 6 5 0.00020 0.00260 0.04340 1000 1.000 0.000
10 4 5 0.01335 0.04211 0.01280 1000 1.000 0.000
11 7 8 0.00000 0.17615 0.00000 1000 1.000 0.000
12 7 9 0.00000 0.11001 0.00000 1000 1.000 0.000
13 9 10 0.03181 0.08450 0.00000 1000 1.000 0.000
14 6 11 0.09498 0.19890 0.00000 1000 1.000 0.000
15 6 12 0.12291 0.25581 0.00000 1000 1.000 0.000
16 6 13 0.06615 0.13027 0.00000 1000 1.000 0.000
17 9 14 0.12711 0.27038 0.00000 1000 1.000 0.000
18 10 11 0.08205 0.19207 0.00000 1000 1.000 0.000
19 12 13 0.22092 0.19988 0.00000 1000 1.000 0.000
20 13 14 0.17093 0.34802 0.00000 1000 1.000 0.000
21 7 8 0.00000 0.17615 0.00000 1000 1.000 0.000
22 7 9 0.00000 0.11001 0.00000 1000 1.000 0.000
23 9 10 0.03181 0.08450 0.00000 1000 1.000 0.000
24 6 11 0.09498 0.19890 0.00000 1000 1.000 0.000
25 6 12 0.12291 0.25581 0.00000 1000 1.000 0.000
26 6 13 0.06615 0.13027 0.00000 1000 1.000 0.000
27 9 14 0.12711 0.27038 0.00000 1000 1.000 0.000
28 10 11 0.08205 0.19207 0.00000 1000 1.000 0.000
29 12 13 0.22092 0.19988 0.00000 1000 1.000 0.000
30 13 14 0.17093 0.34802 0.00000 1000 1.000 0.000
31 7 8 0.00000 0.17615 0.00000 1000 1.000 0.000
32 7 9 0.00000 0.11001 0.00000 1000 1.000 0.000
33 9 10 0.03181 0.08450 0.00000 1000 1.000 0.000
34 6 11 0.09498 0.19890 0.00000 1000 1.000 0.000
35 6 12 0.12291 0.25581 0.00000 1000 1.000 0.000
36 6 13 0.06615 0.13027 0.00000 1000 1.000 0.000
37 9 14 0.12711 0.27038 0.00000 1000 1.000 0.000
38 10 11 0.08205 0.19207 0.00000 1000 1.000 0.000
39 12 13 0.22092 0.19988 0.00000 1000 1.000 0.000
40 13 14 0.17093 0.34802 0.00000 1000 1.000 0.000
41 7 8 0.00000 0.17615 0.00000 1000 1.000 0.000
42 7 9 0.00000 0.11001 0.00000 1000 1.000 0.000
43 9 10 0.03181 0.08450 0.00000 1000 1.000 0.000
44 6 11 0.09498 0.19890 0.00000 1000 1.000 0.000
45 6 12 0.12291 0.25581 0.00000 1000 1.000 0.000
46 6 13 0.06615 0.13027 0.00000 1000 1.000 0.000
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Table XXXVIII. Generator data of IEEE 39-bus system
GenNo BusNo MVA H(s) D(s) Xd(p.u.) X
0
d(p.u.) Xq(p.u.) X
0
q(p.u.) ¿
0
d0(s) ¿
0
q0(s)
1 30 1000 3.50 0.00 0.310 0.310 0.310 0.310 8.96 0.310
2 31 1000 2.53 0.00 0.697 0.697 0.697 0.697 6.00 0.535
3 32 1000 2.98 0.00 0.531 0.531 0.531 0.531 5.89 0.600
4 33 1000 2.38 0.00 0.436 0.436 0.436 0.436 6.00 0.535
5 34 1000 2.17 0.00 1.320 1.320 1.320 1.320 6.00 0.535
6 35 1000 2.90 0.00 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 6.00 0.535
7 36 1000 2.20 0.00 0.490 0.490 0.490 0.490 6.00 0.535
8 37 1000 2.03 0.00 0.570 0.570 0.570 0.570 6.00 0.535
9 38 1000 2.88 0.00 0.570 0.570 0.570 0.570 6.00 0.535
10 39 1000 41.67 0.00 0.060 0.060 0.060 0.060 6.00 0.535
Table XXXIX. Exciter data of IEEE 39-bus system
GenNo BusNo KA KE KF ¿A(s) ¿E(s) ¿F (s) KSe ¿Se(s)
1 30 20 1.00 0.0630 0.2500 0.3140 0.3500 0.0039 1.5550
2 31 20 1.00 0.0630 0.2500 0.3140 0.3500 0.0039 1.5550
3 32 20 1.00 0.0630 0.2500 0.3140 0.3500 0.0039 1.5550
4 33 20 1.00 0.0630 0.2500 0.3140 0.3500 0.0039 1.5550
5 34 20 1.00 0.0630 0.2500 0.3140 0.3500 0.0039 1.5550
6 35 20 1.00 0.0630 0.2500 0.3140 0.3500 0.0039 1.5550
7 36 20 1.00 0.0630 0.2500 0.3140 0.3500 0.0039 1.5550
8 37 20 1.00 0.0630 0.2500 0.3140 0.3500 0.0039 1.5550
9 38 20 1.00 0.0630 0.2500 0.3140 0.3500 0.0039 1.5550
10 39 20 1.00 0.0630 0.2500 0.3140 0.3500 0.0039 1.5550
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APPENDIX D
IEEE 118-BUS TEST SYSTEM DATA
There are ¯ve tables for this test system data: Bus data, PV bus data, Line data,
Generator data, Exciter data. Data desriptions are the same as those in Appendix A.
People can ¯nd some data sources from [108{110] and modify for their own research
purpose.
Table XL.: Bus data of IEEE 118-bus system
BusNo Type PL(MVA) QL(MVA) Bs(MVA) Vm Area
1 2 51.00 27.00 0.00 0.955 1
2 1 20.00 9.00 0.00 0.971 1
3 1 39.00 10.00 0.00 0.968 1
4 2 39.00 12.00 0.00 0.998 1
5 1 0.00 0.00 -40.0 1.002 1
6 2 52.00 22.00 0.00 0.990 1
7 1 19.00 2.00 0.00 0.989 1
8 2 28.00 0.00 0.00 1.015 1
9 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.043 1
10 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.050 1
11 1 70.00 23.00 0.00 0.985 1
12 2 47.00 10.00 0.00 0.990 1
13 1 34.00 16.00 0.00 0.968 1
14 1 14.00 1.00 0.00 0.984 1
15 2 90.00 30.00 0.00 0.970 1
16 1 25.00 10.00 0.00 0.984 1
17 1 11.00 3.00 0.00 0.995 1
18 2 60.00 34.00 0.00 0.973 1
19 2 45.00 25.00 0.00 0.963 1
20 1 18.00 3.00 0.00 0.958 1
21 1 14.00 8.00 0.00 0.959 1
22 1 10.00 5.00 0.00 0.970 1
23 1 7.00 3.00 0.00 1.000 1
24 2 13.00 0.00 0.00 0.992 2
25 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.050 1
26 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.015 1
27 2 71.00 13.00 0.00 0.968 1
28 1 17.00 7.00 0.00 0.962 1
29 1 24.00 4.00 0.00 0.963 1
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BusNo Type PL(MVA) QL(MVA) Bs(MVA) Vm Area
30 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.968 1
31 2 43.00 27.00 0.00 0.967 1
32 2 59.00 23.00 0.00 0.964 1
33 1 23.00 9.00 0.00 0.972 2
34 2 59.00 26.00 14.00 0.986 2
35 1 33.00 9.00 0.00 0.981 2
36 2 31.00 17.00 0.00 0.980 2
37 1 0.00 0.00 -25.0 0.992 2
38 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.962 2
39 1 27.00 11.00 0.00 0.970 2
40 2 66.00 23.00 0.00 0.970 2
41 1 37.00 10.00 0.00 0.967 2
42 2 96.00 23.00 0.00 0.985 2
43 1 18.00 7.00 0.00 0.978 2
44 1 16.00 8.00 10.00 0.985 2
45 1 53.00 22.00 10.00 0.987 2
46 2 28.00 10.00 10.00 1.005 2
47 1 34.00 0.00 0.00 1.017 2
48 1 20.00 11.00 15.00 1.021 2
49 2 87.00 30.00 0.00 1.025 2
50 1 17.00 4.00 0.00 1.001 2
51 1 17.00 8.00 0.00 0.967 2
52 1 18.00 5.00 0.00 0.957 2
53 1 23.00 11.00 0.00 0.946 2
54 2 113.00 32.00 0.00 0.955 2
55 2 63.00 22.00 0.00 0.952 2
56 2 84.00 18.00 0.00 0.954 2
57 1 12.00 3.00 0.00 0.971 2
58 1 12.00 3.00 0.00 0.959 2
59 2 277.00 113.00 0.00 0.985 2
60 1 78.00 3.00 0.00 0.993 2
61 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.995 2
62 2 77.00 14.00 0.00 0.998 2
63 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.969 2
64 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.984 2
65 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.005 2
66 2 39.00 18.00 0.00 1.050 2
67 1 28.00 7.00 0.00 1.020 2
68 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.003 2
69 3 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.035 2
70 2 66.00 20.00 0.00 0.984 2
71 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.987 2
72 2 12.00 0.00 0.00 0.980 2
73 2 6.00 0.00 0.00 0.991 2
74 2 68.00 27.00 12.00 0.958 3
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BusNo Type PL(MVA) QL(MVA) Bs(MVA) Vm Area
75 1 47.00 11.00 0.00 0.967 3
76 2 68.00 36.00 0.00 0.943 3
77 2 61.00 28.00 0.00 1.006 3
78 1 71.00 26.00 0.00 1.003 3
79 1 39.00 32.00 20.00 1.009 3
80 2 130.00 26.00 0.00 1.040 3
81 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.997 3
82 1 54.00 27.00 20.00 0.989 3
83 1 20.00 10.00 10.00 0.985 3
84 1 11.00 7.00 0.00 0.980 3
85 2 24.00 15.00 0.00 0.985 3
86 1 21.00 10.00 0.00 0.987 3
87 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.015 3
88 1 48.00 10.00 0.00 0.987 3
89 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.005 3
90 2 163.00 42.00 0.00 0.985 3
91 2 10.00 0.00 0.00 0.980 3
92 2 65.00 10.00 0.00 0.993 3
93 1 12.00 7.00 0.00 0.987 3
94 1 30.00 16.00 0.00 0.991 3
95 1 42.00 31.00 0.00 0.981 3
96 1 38.00 15.00 0.00 0.993 3
97 1 15.00 9.00 0.00 1.011 3
98 1 34.00 8.00 0.00 1.024 3
99 2 42.00 0.00 0.00 1.010 3
100 2 37.00 18.00 0.00 1.017 3
101 1 22.00 15.00 0.00 0.993 3
102 1 5.00 3.00 0.00 0.991 3
103 2 23.00 16.00 0.00 1.001 3
104 2 38.00 25.00 0.00 0.971 3
105 2 31.00 26.00 20.00 0.965 3
106 1 43.00 16.00 0.00 0.962 3
107 2 50.00 12.00 6.00 0.952 3
108 1 2.00 1.00 0.00 0.967 3
109 1 8.00 3.00 0.00 0.967 3
110 2 39.00 30.00 6.00 0.973 3
111 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.980 3
112 2 68.00 13.00 0.00 0.975 3
113 2 6.00 0.00 0.00 0.993 1
114 1 8.00 3.00 0.00 0.960 1
115 1 22.00 7.00 0.00 0.960 1
116 2 184.00 0.00 0.00 1.005 2
117 1 20.00 8.00 0.00 0.974 1
118 1 33.00 15.00 0.00 0.949 3
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Table XLI.: PV bus data of IEEE 118-bus system
BusNo Pg(MVA) Qg(MVA) Qmax(MVA) Qmin(MVA) Vsp(p.u.) Pmax(MVA)
1 0.00 0.00 15.00 -5.00 0.955 100.00
4 0.00 0.00 300.00 -300.00 0.998 100.00
6 0.00 0.00 50.00 -13.00 0.990 100.00
8 0.00 0.00 300.00 -300.00 1.015 100.00
10 450.00 0.00 250.00 -147.00 1.050 650.00
12 85.00 0.00 120.00 -35.00 0.990 185.00
15 0.00 0.00 30.00 -10.00 0.970 100.00
18 0.00 0.00 50.00 -16.00 0.973 100.00
19 0.00 0.00 24.00 -8.00 0.962 100.00
24 0.00 0.00 300.00 -300.00 0.992 100.00
25 220.00 0.00 140.00 -47.00 1.050 320.00
26 314.00 0.00 1000.00 -1000.00 1.015 414.00
27 0.00 0.00 300.00 -300.00 0.968 100.00
31 7.00 0.00 300.00 -300.00 0.967 107.00
32 0.00 0.00 42.00 -14.00 0.963 100.00
34 0.00 0.00 24.00 -8.00 0.984 100.00
36 0.00 0.00 24.00 -8.00 0.980 100.00
40 0.00 0.00 300.00 -300.00 0.970 100.00
42 0.00 0.00 300.00 -300.00 0.985 100.00
46 19.00 0.00 100.00 -100.00 1.005 119.00
49 204.00 0.00 210.00 -85.00 1.025 304.00
54 48.00 0.00 300.00 -300.00 0.955 148.00
55 0.00 0.00 23.00 -8.00 0.952 100.00
56 0.00 0.00 15.00 -8.00 0.954 100.00
59 155.00 0.00 180.00 -60.00 0.985 255.00
61 160.00 0.00 300.00 -100.00 0.995 260.00
62 0.00 0.00 20.00 -20.00 0.998 100.00
65 391.00 0.00 250.00 -67.00 1.005 591.00
66 392.00 0.00 250.00 -67.00 1.050 592.00
69 516.40 0.00 300.00 -300.00 1.035 805.20
70 0.00 0.00 32.00 -10.00 0.984 100.00
72 0.00 0.00 100.00 -100.00 0.980 100.00
73 0.00 0.00 100.00 -100.00 0.991 100.00
74 0.00 0.00 9.00 -6.00 0.958 100.00
76 0.00 0.00 23.00 -8.00 0.943 100.00
61 160.00 0.00 300.00 -100.00 0.995 260.00
77 0.00 0.00 70.00 -20.00 1.006 100.00
80 477.00 0.00 280.00 -165.00 1.040 677.00
85 0.00 0.00 23.00 -8.00 0.985 100.00
87 4.00 0.00 1000.00 -100.00 1.015 104.00
89 607.00 0.00 300.00 -210.00 1.005 807.00
90 0.00 0.00 300.00 -300.00 0.985 100.00
91 0.00 0.00 100.00 -100.00 0.980 100.00
92 0.00 0.00 9.00 -3.00 0.990 100.00
99 0.00 0.00 100.00 -100.00 1.010 100.00
100 252.00 0.00 155.00 -50.00 1.017 352.00
103 40.00 0.00 40.00 -15.00 1.010 140.00
104 0.00 0.00 23.00 -8.00 0.971 100.00
105 0.00 0.00 23.00 -8.00 0.965 100.00
107 0.00 0.00 250.00 -250.00 0.952 100.00
110 0.00 0.00 23.00 -8.00 0.973 100.00
111 36.00 0.00 1000.00 -100.00 0.980 136.00
112 0.01 0.00 1000.00 -100.00 0.975 100.00
113 0.00 0.00 250.00 -100.00 0.993 100.00
116 0.00 0.00 1000.00 -1000.00 1.005 100.00
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Table XLII.: Line data of IEEE 118-bus system
LineNo fBus tBus r(p.u.) x(p.u.) b(p.u.) limit(MVA) tap-ratio angle
1 1 2 0.03030 0.09990 0.02540 250 1.000 0.000
2 1 3 0.01290 0.04240 0.01082 250 1.000 0.000
3 4 5 0.00176 0.00798 0.00210 250 1.000 0.000
4 3 5 0.02410 0.10800 0.02840 250 1.000 0.000
5 5 6 0.01190 0.05400 0.01426 250 1.000 0.000
6 6 7 0.00459 0.02080 0.00550 250 1.000 0.000
7 8 9 0.00244 0.03050 1.16200 640 1.000 0.000
8 8 5 0.00000 0.02670 0.00000 510 0.985 0.000
9 9 10 0.00258 0.03220 1.23000 650 1.000 0.000
10 4 11 0.02090 0.06880 0.01748 250 1.000 0.000
11 5 11 0.02030 0.06820 0.01738 250 1.000 0.000
12 11 12 0.00595 0.01960 0.00502 250 1.000 0.000
13 2 12 0.01870 0.06160 0.01572 250 1.000 0.000
14 3 12 0.04840 0.16000 0.04060 250 1.000 0.000
15 7 12 0.00862 0.03400 0.00874 250 1.000 0.000
16 11 13 0.02225 0.07310 0.01876 250 1.000 0.000
17 12 14 0.02150 0.07070 0.01816 250 1.000 0.000
18 13 15 0.07440 0.24440 0.06268 250 1.000 0.000
19 14 15 0.05950 0.19500 0.05020 250 1.000 0.000
20 12 16 0.02120 0.08340 0.02140 250 1.000 0.000
21 15 17 0.01320 0.04370 0.04440 250 1.000 0.000
22 16 17 0.04540 0.18010 0.04660 250 1.000 0.000
23 17 18 0.01230 0.05050 0.01298 250 1.000 0.000
24 18 19 0.01119 0.04930 0.01142 250 1.000 0.000
25 19 20 0.02520 0.11700 0.02980 250 1.000 0.000
26 15 19 0.01200 0.03940 0.01010 250 1.000 0.000
27 20 21 0.01830 0.08490 0.02160 250 1.000 0.000
28 21 22 0.02090 0.09700 0.02460 250 1.000 0.000
29 22 23 0.03420 0.15900 0.04040 250 1.000 0.000
30 23 24 0.01350 0.04920 0.04980 250 1.000 0.000
31 23 25 0.01560 0.08000 0.08640 380 1.000 0.000
32 26 25 0.00000 0.03820 0.00000 380 0.960 0.000
33 25 27 0.03180 0.16300 0.17640 280 1.000 0.000
34 27 28 0.01913 0.08550 0.02160 250 1.000 0.000
35 28 29 0.02370 0.09430 0.02380 250 1.000 0.000
36 30 17 0.00000 0.03880 0.00000 520 0.960 0.000
37 8 30 0.00431 0.05040 0.51400 500 1.000 0.000
38 26 30 0.00799 0.08600 0.90800 380 1.000 0.000
39 17 31 0.04740 0.15630 0.03990 250 1.000 0.000
40 29 31 0.01080 0.03310 0.00830 250 1.000 0.000
41 23 32 0.03170 0.11530 0.11730 250 1.000 0.000
42 31 32 0.02980 0.09850 0.02510 250 1.000 0.000
43 27 32 0.02290 0.07550 0.01926 250 1.000 0.000
44 15 33 0.03800 0.12440 0.03194 250 1.000 0.000
45 19 34 0.07520 0.24700 0.06320 250 1.000 0.000
46 35 36 0.00224 0.01020 0.00268 250 1.000 0.000
47 35 37 0.01100 0.04970 0.01318 250 1.000 0.000
48 33 37 0.04150 0.14200 0.03660 250 1.000 0.000
49 34 36 0.00871 0.02680 0.00568 250 1.000 0.000
50 34 37 0.00256 0.00940 0.00984 250 1.000 0.000
51 38 37 0.00000 0.03750 0.00000 350 0.935 0.000
52 37 39 0.03210 0.10600 0.02700 250 1.000 0.000
53 37 40 0.05930 0.16800 0.04200 250 1.000 0.000
54 30 38 0.00464 0.05400 0.42200 250 1.000 0.000
55 39 40 0.01840 0.06050 0.01552 250 1.000 0.000
56 40 41 0.01450 0.04870 0.01222 250 1.000 0.000
57 40 42 0.05550 0.18300 0.04660 250 1.000 0.000
58 41 42 0.04100 0.13500 0.03440 250 1.000 0.000
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LineNo fBus tBus r(p.u.) x(p.u.) b(p.u.) limit(MVA) tap-ratio angle
59 43 44 0.06080 0.24540 0.06068 250 1.000 0.000
60 34 43 0.04130 0.16810 0.04226 250 1.000 0.000
61 44 45 0.02240 0.09010 0.02240 250 1.000 0.000
62 45 46 0.04000 0.13560 0.03320 250 1.000 0.000
63 46 47 0.03800 0.12700 0.03160 250 1.000 0.000
64 46 48 0.06010 0.18900 0.04720 250 1.000 0.000
65 47 49 0.01910 0.06250 0.01604 250 1.000 0.000
66 42 49 0.07150 0.32300 0.08600 250 1.000 0.000
67 42 49 0.07150 0.32300 0.08600 250 1.000 0.000
68 45 49 0.06840 0.18600 0.04440 250 1.000 0.000
69 48 49 0.01790 0.05050 0.01258 250 1.000 0.000
70 49 50 0.02670 0.07520 0.01874 250 1.000 0.000
71 49 51 0.04860 0.13700 0.03420 250 1.000 0.000
72 51 52 0.02030 0.05880 0.01396 250 1.000 0.000
73 52 53 0.04050 0.16350 0.04058 250 1.000 0.000
74 53 54 0.02630 0.12200 0.03100 250 1.000 0.000
75 49 54 0.07300 0.28900 0.07380 250 1.000 0.000
76 49 54 0.07300 0.28900 0.07380 250 1.000 0.000
77 54 55 0.01690 0.07070 0.02020 250 1.000 0.000
78 54 56 0.00275 0.00955 0.00732 250 1.000 0.000
79 55 56 0.00488 0.01510 0.00374 250 1.000 0.000
80 56 57 0.03430 0.09660 0.02420 250 1.000 0.000
81 50 57 0.04740 0.13400 0.03320 250 1.000 0.000
82 56 58 0.03430 0.09660 0.02420 250 1.000 0.000
83 51 58 0.02550 0.07190 0.01788 250 1.000 0.000
84 54 59 0.05030 0.22930 0.05980 250 1.000 0.000
85 56 59 0.08250 0.25100 0.05690 250 1.000 0.000
86 56 59 0.08250 0.25100 0.05690 250 1.000 0.000
87 55 59 0.04739 0.21580 0.05646 250 1.000 0.000
88 59 60 0.03170 0.14500 0.03760 250 1.000 0.000
89 59 61 0.03280 0.15000 0.03880 250 1.000 0.000
90 60 61 0.00264 0.01350 0.01456 250 1.000 0.000
91 60 62 0.01230 0.05610 0.01468 250 1.000 0.000
92 61 62 0.00824 0.03760 0.00980 250 1.000 0.000
93 63 59 0.00000 0.03860 0.00000 250 0.960 0.000
94 63 64 0.00172 0.02000 0.21600 250 1.000 0.000
95 64 61 0.00000 0.02680 0.00000 250 0.985 0.000
96 38 65 0.00901 0.09860 1.04600 250 1.000 0.000
97 64 65 0.00269 0.03020 0.38000 250 1.000 0.000
98 49 66 0.01800 0.09190 0.02480 250 1.000 0.000
99 49 66 0.01800 0.09190 0.02480 250 1.000 0.000
100 62 66 0.04820 0.21800 0.05780 250 1.000 0.000
101 62 67 0.02580 0.11700 0.03100 250 1.000 0.000
102 65 66 0.00000 0.03700 0.00000 250 0.935 0.000
103 66 67 0.02240 0.10150 0.02682 250 1.000 0.000
104 65 68 0.00138 0.01600 0.63800 480 1.000 0.000
105 47 69 0.08440 0.27780 0.07092 250 1.000 0.000
106 49 69 0.09850 0.32400 0.08280 250 1.000 0.000
107 68 69 0.00000 0.03700 0.00000 500 0.935 0.000
108 69 70 0.03000 0.12700 0.12200 300 1.000 0.000
109 24 70 0.00221 0.41150 0.10198 250 1.000 0.000
110 70 71 0.00882 0.03550 0.00878 250 1.000 0.000
111 24 72 0.04880 0.19600 0.04880 250 1.000 0.000
112 71 72 0.04460 0.18000 0.04444 250 1.000 0.000
113 71 73 0.00866 0.04540 0.01178 250 1.000 0.000
114 70 74 0.04010 0.13230 0.03368 250 1.000 0.000
115 70 75 0.04280 0.14100 0.03600 250 1.000 0.000
116 69 75 0.04050 0.12200 0.12400 280 1.000 0.000
117 74 75 0.01230 0.04060 0.01034 250 1.000 0.000
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LineNo fBus tBus r(p.u.) x(p.u.) b(p.u.) limit(MVA) tap-ratio angle
118 76 77 0.04440 0.14800 0.03680 250 1.000 0.000
119 69 77 0.03090 0.10100 0.10380 580 1.000 0.000
120 75 77 0.06010 0.19990 0.04978 250 1.000 0.000
121 77 78 0.00376 0.01240 0.01264 250 1.000 0.000
122 78 79 0.00546 0.02440 0.00648 250 1.000 0.000
123 77 80 0.01700 0.04850 0.04720 250 1.000 0.000
124 77 80 0.02940 0.10500 0.02280 250 1.000 0.000
125 79 80 0.01560 0.07040 0.01870 250 1.000 0.000
126 68 81 0.00175 0.02020 0.80800 560 1.000 0.000
127 81 80 0.00000 0.03700 0.00000 560 0.935 0.000
128 77 82 0.02980 0.08530 0.08174 250 1.000 0.000
129 82 83 0.01120 0.03665 0.03796 250 1.000 0.000
130 83 84 0.06250 0.13200 0.02580 250 1.000 0.000
131 83 85 0.04300 0.14800 0.03480 250 1.000 0.000
132 84 85 0.03020 0.06410 0.01234 250 1.000 0.000
133 85 86 0.03500 0.12300 0.02760 250 1.000 0.000
134 86 87 0.02828 0.20740 0.04450 250 1.000 0.000
135 85 88 0.02000 0.10200 0.02760 250 1.000 0.000
136 85 89 0.02390 0.17300 0.04700 250 1.000 0.000
137 88 89 0.01390 0.07120 0.01934 250 1.000 0.000
138 89 90 0.05180 0.18800 0.05280 250 1.000 0.000
139 89 90 0.02380 0.09970 0.10600 250 1.000 0.000
140 90 91 0.02540 0.08360 0.02140 250 1.000 0.000
141 89 92 0.00990 0.05050 0.05480 250 1.000 0.000
142 89 92 0.03930 0.15810 0.04140 250 1.000 0.000
143 91 92 0.03870 0.12720 0.03268 250 1.000 0.000
144 92 93 0.02580 0.08480 0.02180 250 1.000 0.000
145 92 94 0.04810 0.15800 0.04060 250 1.000 0.000
146 93 94 0.02230 0.07320 0.01876 250 1.000 0.000
147 94 95 0.01320 0.04340 0.01110 250 1.000 0.000
148 80 96 0.03560 0.18200 0.04940 250 1.000 0.000
149 82 96 0.01620 0.05300 0.05440 250 1.000 0.000
150 94 96 0.02690 0.08690 0.02300 250 1.000 0.000
151 80 97 0.01830 0.09340 0.02540 250 1.000 0.000
152 80 98 0.02380 0.10800 0.02860 250 1.000 0.000
153 80 99 0.04540 0.20600 0.05460 250 1.000 0.000
154 92 100 0.06480 0.29500 0.04720 250 1.000 0.000
155 94 100 0.01780 0.05800 0.06040 250 1.000 0.000
156 95 96 0.01710 0.05470 0.01474 250 1.000 0.000
157 96 97 0.01730 0.08850 0.02400 250 1.000 0.000
158 98 100 0.03970 0.17900 0.04760 250 1.000 0.000
159 99 100 0.01800 0.08130 0.02160 250 1.000 0.000
160 100 101 0.02770 0.12620 0.03280 250 1.000 0.000
161 92 102 0.01230 0.05590 0.01464 250 1.000 0.000
162 101 102 0.02460 0.11200 0.02940 250 1.000 0.000
163 100 103 0.01600 0.05250 0.05360 250 1.000 0.000
164 100 104 0.04510 0.20400 0.05410 250 1.000 0.000
165 103 104 0.04660 0.15840 0.04070 250 1.000 0.000
166 103 105 0.05350 0.16250 0.04080 250 1.000 0.000
167 100 106 0.06050 0.22900 0.06200 250 1.000 0.000
168 104 105 0.00994 0.03780 0.00986 250 1.000 0.000
169 105 106 0.01400 0.05470 0.01434 250 1.000 0.000
170 105 107 0.05300 0.18300 0.04720 250 1.000 0.000
171 105 108 0.02610 0.07030 0.01844 250 1.000 0.000
172 106 107 0.05300 0.18300 0.04720 250 1.000 0.000
173 108 109 0.01050 0.02880 0.00760 250 1.000 0.000
174 103 110 0.03906 0.18130 0.04610 250 1.000 0.000
175 109 110 0.02780 0.07620 0.02020 250 1.000 0.000
176 110 111 0.02200 0.07550 0.02000 250 1.000 0.000
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LineNo fBus tBus r(p.u.) x(p.u.) b(p.u.) limit(MVA) tap-ratio angle
177 110 112 0.02470 0.06400 0.06200 250 1.000 0.000
178 17 113 0.00913 0.03010 0.00768 250 1.000 0.000
179 32 113 0.06150 0.20300 0.05180 250 1.000 0.000
180 32 114 0.01350 0.06120 0.01628 250 1.000 0.000
181 27 115 0.01640 0.07410 0.01972 250 1.000 0.000
182 114 115 0.00230 0.01040 0.00276 250 1.000 0.000
183 68 116 0.00034 0.00405 0.16400 300 1.000 0.000
184 12 117 0.03290 0.14000 0.03580 250 1.000 0.000
185 75 118 0.01450 0.04810 0.01198 250 1.000 0.000
186 76 118 0.01640 0.05440 0.01356 250 1.000 0.000
Table XLIII. Generator data of IEEE 118-bus system
GenNo BusNo MVA H(s) D(s) Xd(p.u.) X
0
d(p.u.) Xq(p.u.) X
0
q(p.u.) ¿
0
d0(s) ¿
0
q0(s)
1 10 800 8.00 0.00 0.0875 0.0875 0.0875 0.0875 7.40 0.000
2 12 800 22.00 0.00 0.0636 0.0636 0.0636 0.0636 6.10 0.300
3 25 800 8.00 0.00 0.1750 0.1750 0.1750 0.1750 6.10 0.300
4 26 800 14.00 0.00 0.1000 0.1000 0.1000 0.1000 4.75 1.500
5 31 800 26.00 0.00 0.0538 0.0538 0.0538 0.0538 4.75 1.500
6 46 800 8.00 0.00 0.0875 0.0875 0.0875 0.0875 7.40 0.000
7 49 800 8.00 0.00 0.0875 0.0875 0.0875 0.0875 6.10 0.300
8 54 800 8.00 0.00 0.0875 0.0875 0.0875 0.0875 6.10 0.300
9 59 800 8.00 0.00 0.0875 0.0875 0.0875 0.0875 4.75 1.500
10 61 800 12.00 0.00 0.1167 0.1167 0.1167 0.1167 4.75 1.500
11 65 800 10.00 0.00 0.1400 0.1400 0.1400 0.1400 7.40 0.000
12 66 800 12.00 0.00 0.1167 0.1167 0.1167 0.1167 6.10 0.300
13 69 800 20.00 0.00 0.0700 0.0700 0.0700 0.0700 6.10 0.300
14 80 800 20.00 0.00 0.0700 0.0700 0.0700 0.0700 4.75 1.500
15 87 800 30.00 0.00 0.0467 0.0467 0.0467 0.0467 4.75 1.500
16 89 800 38.148 0.00 0.0500 0.0500 0.0500 0.0500 7.40 0.000
17 100 800 32.00 0.00 0.0438 0.0438 0.0438 0.0438 6.10 0.300
18 103 800 8.00 0.00 0.0875 0.0875 0.0875 0.0875 6.10 0.300
19 111 800 16.00 0.00 0.0875 0.0875 0.0875 0.0875 4.75 1.500
20 112 800 15.00 0.00 0.0467 0.0467 0.0467 0.0467 4.75 1.500
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Table XLIV. Exciter data of IEEE 118-bus system
GenNo BusNo KA KE KF ¿A(s) ¿E(s) ¿F (s) KSe ¿Se(s)
1 10 20 1.00 0.0012 0.0250 0.000 1.00 0.0039 1.555
2 12 20 1.00 0.0010 0.0250 0.314 1.00 0.0039 1.555
3 25 20 1.00 0.0010 0.0250 0.314 1.00 0.0039 1.555
4 26 20 1.00 0.0010 0.0250 0.314 1.00 0.0039 1.555
5 31 20 1.00 0.0010 0.0250 0.314 1.00 0.0039 1.555
6 46 20 1.00 0.0012 0.0250 0.000 1.00 0.0039 1.555
7 49 20 1.00 0.0010 0.0250 0.314 1.00 0.0039 1.555
8 54 20 1.00 0.0010 0.0250 0.314 1.00 0.0039 1.555
9 59 20 1.00 0.0010 0.0250 0.314 1.00 0.0039 1.555
10 61 20 1.00 0.0010 0.0250 0.314 1.00 0.0039 1.555
11 65 20 1.00 0.0012 0.0250 0.000 1.00 0.0039 1.555
12 66 20 1.00 0.0010 0.0250 0.314 1.00 0.0039 1.555
13 69 20 1.00 0.0010 0.0250 0.314 1.00 0.0039 1.555
14 80 20 1.00 0.0010 0.0250 0.314 1.00 0.0039 1.555
15 87 20 1.00 0.0010 0.0250 0.314 1.00 0.0039 1.555
16 89 20 1.00 0.0012 0.0250 0.000 1.00 0.0039 1.555
17 100 20 1.00 0.0010 0.0250 0.314 1.00 0.0039 1.555
18 103 20 1.00 0.0010 0.0250 0.314 1.00 0.0039 1.555
19 111 20 1.00 0.0010 0.0250 0.314 1.00 0.0039 1.555
20 112 20 1.00 0.0010 0.0250 0.314 1.00 0.0039 1.555
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